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VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, HATE
SPEECH, AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY:
A REPLY
James Weinstein*
INTRODUCTION
In my Opening Article I explored the potential of
“upstream” speech restrictions to undermine the political
legitimacy of “downstream” laws.1 Using hate speech bans as an
example, I argued that these restrictions had the potential to
seriously compromise, and in some cases even annihilate, the
legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws as applied to those whose
ability to publicly object to these downstream laws had been
impaired by the speech bans. Professor Jeremy Waldron, whose
criticism of Professor Ronald Dworkin’s and my previous and
rather cursory presentations of this proposition inspired me to
more fully explore and develop this position, wrote a response to
my Opening Article.2 A group of distinguished scholars from
several nations and working in various disciplines then
commented on this discussion.3
* Dan Cracchiolo Chair in Constitutional Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of
Law, Arizona State University. I am grateful to Trevor Allan, Dick Arenson, Jill Hasday,
Jeff Murphy, Robert Post, Jake Rowbottom, Fred Schauer, Mary Sigler, Cynthia
Stonnington, Wayne Sumner for their helpful comments and to James Hall, Luci Davis,
and Austin Yost for their valuable research assistance.
1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017).
2. Jeremy Waldron, The Conditions of Legitimacy of Legitimacy: A Response to
James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2017).
3. Vincent Blasi, Hate Speech, Public Assurance, and the Civic Standing of
Speakers and Victims, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 585 (2017); Alexander Brown, Hate Speech
Laws, Legitimacy, and Precaution: A Reply to James Weinstein, 32 CONST. COMMENT.
599 (2017); Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech—Definitions and Empirical Evidence, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 619 (2017); Eric Heinze, Taking Legitimacy Seriously: A Return to
Deontology, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 631 (2017); Robert Post, Legitimacy and Hate Speech,
32 CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2017); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and Obedience to
Law, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 661 (2017); Steven H. Shiffrin, Hate Speech, Legitimacy, and
the Foundational Principles of Government, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 675 (2017); Adrienne
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Admirably fulfilling his role as my principal interlocutor,
Waldron filed a vigorous and comprehensive conceptual
challenge to the position that upstream speech restrictions can
deprive downstream laws of legitimacy. Although none of the
commentators fully embraced Waldron’s wholesale rejection of
my position, several offered trenchant challenges to some
specific aspects of my argument. But the brunt of the
disagreement with my Opening Article was empirical and
related specifically to hate speech. Several commentators
thought that I exaggerated the extent of the restriction that hate
speech bans had placed on the ability of people to oppose
antidiscrimination measures. They also claimed that I
underestimated the effect on legitimacy resulting from hate
speech itself. There was also vigorous disagreement about the
appropriate legal response in a state of uncertainty about the
harmful effects of hate speech.
In this Reply I will address both the general criticism of my
view that viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse can
deprive downstream laws of legitimacy, as well as the specific
criticism of my claims about the detrimental effect on the
legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws resulting from hate speech
bans. But before doing so, I think it might be helpful to explain
why I chose hate speech as the exemplar of speech restrictions
with the potential to undermine the legitimacy of downstream
laws. I will also address a concern raised by Professor Frederick
Schauer about this choice.
To explore the idea that upstream speech restrictions can
impair the legitimacy of downstream laws, I focused on hate
speech bans for several reasons. First, I was aware of no other
type of speech restriction commonly applied (or misapplied) in
liberal democracies as likely to have this effect. In addition, as
just mentioned, the first person to critically engage the
proposition that a speech restriction could deprive a downstream
law of legitimacy was Waldron, who did so in two works
defending narrow restrictions on hate speech.4 Finally, as
Stone, Viewpoint Discrimination, Hate Speech Laws, and the Double-Sided Nature of
Freedom of Speech, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 687 (2017).
4. Jeremy Waldron, Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy [hereinafter Waldron,
Political Legitimacy], in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH 329, 339–40
n.43 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012); JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN
HATE SPEECH (2012) [hereinafter WALDRON, HATE SPEECH].
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Professor Vincent Blasi appreciates in his Commentary, I was
concerned that hate speech bans enacted to protect members of
vulnerable minorities may have the perverse effect of impairing
the legitimacy of antidiscrimination measures enacted to protect
these same individuals.5
In his Commentary, Professor Schauer expresses the
concern that the focus on hate speech restrictions risks that “the
analysis of interesting and important questions about the
relationship between political legitimacy and freedom of speech
will be both crowded out and distorted” by this contentious
subject.6 Schauer’s fear has, at least to some extent, materialized:
the discussion has morphed into one in which the propriety of
hate speech bans in liberal democratic societies has assumed
equal billing with the relationship between free speech and
political legitimacy. This shift in emphasis has undoubtedly, as
Schauer predicted, resulted in a somewhat less sharp focus on
the relationship between free speech and legitimacy than I had
hoped for. On the other hand, this development may at the same
time have been beneficial if, as two commentators have claimed,
examining hate speech regulation through the lens of political
legitimacy has moved the stale and stalled discussion of
propriety of hate speech in a novel and helpful direction.7 In Part
I of this Reply I will try to mitigate the problem that Schauer
identified by addressing with as few references to hate speech as
possible Waldron’s largely conceptual objection to my argument.
I will also reply to some more specific objections to the view that
speech restrictions can rob downstream laws of legitimacy. I will
then in Part II reply to various criticisms of my argument that
hate speech restrictions as they actually operate in many
democratic societies have undermined the legitimacy of
antidiscrimination measures.

5. Blasi, supra note 3, at 590-91.
6. Schauer, supra note 3, at 665.
7. See Blasi, supra note 3, at 585 (In “open[ing] up a promising line of inquiry
regarding the legitimacy and propriety of hate speech regulation” this discussion has
“succeeded in reinvigorating a subject that [has] grown academically formulaic even
while becoming alarmingly more salient politically and culturally.”); Stone, supra note 3,
at 687 (“The essays to which we are responding take the long and rather well-worn
debate about hate speech in new directions.”).
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I. CHALLENGES TO THE CLAIM THAT UPSTREAM
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS CAN DEPRIVE DOWNSTREAM
LEGISLATION OF LEGITIMACY
A. WALDRON’S CRITIQUE OF THE CLAIM THAT UPSTREAM
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS CAN RENDER IMMORAL
ENFORCEMENT OF DOWNSTREAM LEGISLATION
As already noted, Waldron is the only participant in this
Symposium to file a wholesale challenge to the position that
speech restrictions can impair, and in some instances even
destroy,8 the legitimacy of a downstream legislation as applied to
citizens whose ability to speak out against the legislation was
impaired by the speech restriction. It should be noted, however,
that Waldron challenges only the normative aspect of my claim.
He does not take issue with the contention that upstream speech
restriction can have a detrimental effect on the descriptive
legitimacy of downstream legislation.
The idea that I developed and defended in my Opening
Article concerning the downstream effect of upstream speech
restrictions was a novel one, apparently more so than I
appreciated,9 and as such, required rigorous testing. I am
8. Waldron is mistaken that I agree with what he characterizes as Dworkin’s
concession that the potential effect of a speech restriction on legitimacy “was diminution
rather than destruction” of downstream legislation. Waldron, supra note 2, at 705. First
of all, Waldron may be over reading the extent of Dworkin’s concession. In agreeing
that, despite the restrictions on political expression imposed by its upstream restrictions
on hate speech, “[o]n balance Britain is entitled to enforce” its downstream
antidiscrimination laws, Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335 (quoting
email from Ronald Dworkin to Jeremy Waldron, Oct. 4, 2009, 21:34 EST (on file with
Waldron)), Dworkin did not necessarily concede that under no circumstances could a
speech restriction destroy the legitimacy of a downstream law. Rather, I read Dworkin as
leaving this possibility open. In any event, this was precisely the question that I explored
in my Opening Article and contrary to Waldron, as shown in my Evangelical
Photographer Scenario, Weinstein, supra note 1, at 567, I do believe that under certain
circumstances such destruction is possible. Waldron is correct, however, in observing that
in my view for a speech restriction to destroy the legitimacy of a downstream law there
must already be other difficulties with the morality of enforcing the downstream law.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 706. I should add that if Dworkin was referring, as Waldron
dubiously claims he was (see infra note 9), to the inability of a single hate speech law to
destroy the legitimacy of the entire legal system, then I, of course, agree that it cannot.
See text accompanying note 43, infra.
9. Until reading Waldron’s response, I thought my position regarding the effect
that speech restrictions might have on political legitimacy was essentially the same as
Dworkin’s. Waldron, however, considers my position in two crucial respects more
“modest” and “focused” than Dworkin’s and thus more defensible. Waldron, supra note
2, at 705–06. First, he thinks that Dworkin was concerned with the effect of hate speech
restrictions not on particular downstream legislation, as I am, but with its effect on
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therefore most grateful to Waldron for providing a thoughtful,
comprehensive, and vigorous critique of this position. As a
preliminary matter, though, it is worth noting that Waldron may
characterize my position somewhat more strongly than I meant
to express it.
Waldron writes that I contend that an upstream speech
restriction, Lu, can so severely impair a particular person’s, P’s,
ability to speak out against a proposed downstream law, Ld, that
P has “a right that it not be enforced against him.”10 But this
paraphrase is not quite accurate, for I said nothing about the P
having a “right” not to have Ld enforcement against him; rather,
I claimed only that such enforcement was immoral. I do not
believe it to be the case that people necessarily have even a
moral right not to have immoral laws enforced against them.11
Still, given the nature of the deprivation described in my
Evangelical Photographer Scenario,12 it is a fair inference from
systemic legitimacy. Id. at 705, Professor Eric Heinze shares this view. See ERIC HEINZE,
HATE SPEECH AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 86 (2016). In addition, Waldron thinks
that it was my innovation to focus on the effects of speech restrictions on downstream
legislation only with regard to those constrained by the upstream speech restriction.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 706. As to his first point, I am not at all sure that Waldron and
Heinze are right that Dworkin was concerned with the effect of hate speech laws on the
entire legal system rather than their effect on particular downstream laws. Thus Dworkin
writes: “[But] if we intervene too soon in the process through which collective opinion is
formed, we spoil the only democratic justification we have for insisting that everyone
obey these laws.” Ronald Dworkin, Foreword to RONALD DWORKIN, EXTREME SPEECH
AND DEMOCRACY vii (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) (emphasis added). In
addition, Dworkin states that “on balance Britain is entitled to enforce such laws.” Id.
(emphasis added). As to his second claim, although I was unaware of it, my view that the
legitimacy defect in enforcing the downstream law is limited to those constrained by the
law may have been a modification of Dworkin’s more encompassing view. Waldron
suggests that I made these modifications of Dworkin’s position “simply to make it come
out as less implausible than Dworkin’s wholesale version.” Waldron, supra note 2, at 707
Though I did not consciously modify Dworkin’s position for this or any other reason, I
would have thought that modifying a position to try to make it “less implausible” is a
good thing.
10. Waldron, supra note 2, at 709. Especially phrasing my argument this way, it is
puzzling how Waldron could think that I do not take the position that an upstream
speech restriction cannot “destroy” the legitimacy of downstream legislation. See supra
note 8.
11. For example, it is morally outrageous that most salaried employees in the
United States making more than $15,000 per year pay some income tax, while some
billionaires pay none. Nonetheless, I am not prepared to say that these employees have a
moral right as opposed to a good moral reason not to be assessed income tax.
12. In that Scenario, it will be recalled, Lu significantly curtailed the ability of P
(Elaine) to speak out against Ld, whose application infringed Elaine’s fundamental right
to religious liberty. This confluence of procedural and substantive moral deprivation
gives rise to strong moral reason against enforcement. But as I discussed in my Opening
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what I wrote that Elaine does have a moral right not to have the
antidiscrimination law enforced against her for refusing to
photograph a same-sex marriage.13 Where Waldron may
overstate my position is if he reads me as contending that this
moral right necessarily implies that there should be a
corresponding positive law right against enforcement. While I
think there should be a presumption in any legal system against
the enforcement of laws that violate moral rights, I do not
believe that in every such instance people should necessarily
have a positive law right against such enforcement. This is
because in my view doctrinal “fit” as well as morality should play
a role in determining whether a right should be recognized.14
Article, the same-sex couple’s interest in equal treatment in places of public
accommodation supplies a strong countervailing moral reason supporting enforcement.
The point of the Scenario is that the speech restriction has changed the moral valence of
enforcement from positive to negative. Consistent with Waldron’s reformulation of my
position, one could conceive the EP Scenario as presenting a clash of moral rights, with
the right against enforcement prevailing. With such strong moral claims on both sides,
however, I prefer to eschew such rights talk and simply say that, on balance, the
restriction on Elaine’s ability to oppose the antidiscrimination measure renders immoral
its enforcement against her for refusing to photograph the wedding. A clearer case for a
speech restriction giving rise to a moral right against enforcement would occur in the
absence of such a strong moral reason supporting enforcement. This might be the
situation, for instance, with enforcement of a law forbidding polygamy against someone
whose opportunity to speak out against the ban on plural marriage had been severely
curtailed.
13. Of course, this does not mean that Elaine in fact has a positive law right that Ld
not be enforced against her. The existence of such a right depends on particularities of
the legal system in which the right is claimed, including the availability of higher-order
positive law such as a constitutional provision on which an exemption can be based. In
using the term “rights” in his summary of my position, Waldron is obviously referring to
moral rights, not positive law rights. As explained in the text, however, his description of
my position might erroneously attribute to me the view that there should in all cases in
which Lu has rendered enforcement of Ld immoral be a positive law right against such
enforcement.
14. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 738 n.92. Waldron also describes my position as
holding that P “has a right to disobey” Ld. Waldron, supra note 2, at 709. But I said
nothing about a “right” to disobey, only that Lu destroyed any political obligation that P
may have had to obey that law, that is, to obey the law just because it is the law. See
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 535. Perhaps having been influenced by Waldron’s Response,
Professor Eric Heinze also reads me as arguing for a “right of disobedience . . . by a
citizen whose views are excluded” from public discourse by a speech ban. Heinze, supra
note 3, at 644. Expressly citing Waldron’s Response, Shiffrin also thinks my argument
“confers a license” on P to disobey the law. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 682. Concededly,
and analogous to what I said about Elaine having a moral right not to have the
antidiscrimination law enforced against her, indeed precisely because this enforcement
would be immoral, I think Elaine does have a moral right not to obey the law’s
requirement that she photograph the same-sex wedding. But as with the enforcement
question, this conclusion does not entail the view that she should have a positive law right
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In addition, and more significantly, Waldron’s imputation of
a rights generating effect of my position talks past an important
aspect of the claim. Although I believe that under certain
circumstances a viewpoint-discriminatory speech restriction can
indeed render immoral enforcement of a downstream law, much
more commonly such restrictions will diminish but not utterly
destroy the legitimacy of the Ld’s enforcement. So to the extent
that Waldron’s criticism of my position derives from what he
sees as its improbable “deontic” consequences,15 it fails to
engage my claim that upstream speech restrictions can impair
normative legitimacy short of destroying it. For such non-lethal
damage to legitimacy, while something to “regret,”16 has no
particular implication for generations of rights, moral or
positive.17
With these clarifications of my position, we are now in a
position to evaluate Waldron’s critique of it.
There are several crucial flaws in Waldron’s analysis that
undercut his conclusion that upstream speech restrictions cannot
render immoral the enforcement of downstream legislation
to an exemption from the law’s operation. (Cf. Heinze, supra note 3, at 644, attributing to
me the view that those who have been excluded from public discourse by a viewpointbased speech restriction should have “immunity” from, and not “face the legal
consequences” for disobeying, the downstream law.) And it obviously does not mean
that she in fact has such a right.
15. Waldron, supra note 2, at 709.
16. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 334 (quoting email from Ronald
Dworkin to Jeremy Waldron, Oct. 4, 2009, 21:34 EST (on file with Waldron)).
17. That Lu can damage short of destroying the legitimacy of enforcing Ld against P
also shows why I do not, as Shiffrin contends, “give up the ghost” with respect to the
effects on legitimacy resulting from restrictions on racist speech. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at
681. Shiffrin notes that I specify that “the problem of justifying coercion to a free and
autonomous person” arises only when P can reasonably disagree with Ld. But, he
continues, since it would be extremely difficult if not impossible “to formulate a
persuasive case that arguments based in racial prejudice amount to reasonable
disagreement[],” my argument about free speech and legitimacy has no bearing with
regard to restrictions on racist speech. Id. To begin with, I think Shiffrin too facilely
assumes that while there can be reasonable disagreement about whether it is moral to
legally force a person to photograph a same-sex wedding in violation of her religious
convictions, there can be no reasonable disagreement about forcing someone to
photograph an interracial marriage in violation of her religious dictates. Much would
depend on whether the racial discrimination in question constitutes “racial prejudice.”
Cf., a photographer who belongs to a Black Nationalist religion refusing to photograph
an interracial marriage. But even if Shiffrin is right about this, restrictions on racist
speech might nevertheless diminish without destroying the legitimacy of enforcing
antidiscrimination laws against a racist whose ability to express his authentic reasons for
opposing these laws was curtailed by an upstream speech restriction.
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against particular individuals. Waldron begins his critique by
asserting that “debates and decisions in a representative
legislature are usually seen as legitimizing the enforcement as
law of the bills that survive this process.”18 For a moment, then,
it seems as if Waldron is going to assert that the legislative
process is alone sufficient to legitimize any law resulting from
this process, even one with which people can reasonably
disagree. And perhaps Waldron in fact holds this view.19 He
decides, however, not to rest his entire case on such a
parsimonious and highly contestable view of the relationship
between free speech and political legitimacy.20 Rather, Waldron
allows that the “best case” for my argument “looks at the
informal public debate that is involved in the election and
electoral accountability of legislators and in the debates in the
community that complement legislative debates in the
parliament.”21
But even on the assumption that public discourse is “an
indispensable part of the political process,” the restriction of
which might perhaps have some impact on downstream
legislation, it is “quite another thing” in Waldron’s view to assert
that legal restrictions on this “chaotic and unformed” public
debate can have the direct consequences for legitimacy that I
claim.22 For even were a speech restriction to have a “deleterious

18. Waldron, supra note 2, at 707.
19. Thus Waldron writes that he wants to “dispute the whole argument” that
upstream speech restrictions can have the “deontic effect” on the “rights” of people
regarding downstream legislation that I suppose. Waldron, supra note 2, at 707. He adds
that “suppose one were to concede that hate speech laws have a deleterious impact on
the quality of the political process . . . [t]he most I would concede is that something has
gone wrong with the character of public debate overall,” but denies that the “moral
effects” of this speech restriction can generate particular rights. Id. In contrast to his view
that speech restrictions cannot affect the normative legitimacy of a particular
downstream law in the way I contend, Waldron is willing to go so far as to not deny that
speech restrictions can affect systemic legitimacy. Id. at 711.
20. Thus as Dean Robert Post aptly observes in his Commentary: “It is not
sufficient to observe that members of a legislative assembly are free to express their
opposition to the statute . . . . Freedom of speech underwrites democratic legitimation
when it allows persons to participate in the formation of public opinion.” Post, supra note
3, at 654. See also id. (“Elections are only an ‘intermittent mechanism,’ whereas public
opinion is ‘constantly active’ and, ‘in the long run,’ can exercise ‘a great and growing
influence,’” (quoting 3 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 159 (New
York, MacMillan & Co. 1888))).
21. Waldron, supra note 2, at 708.
22. Id. at 709.
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impact on the quality of the political process,”23 the difficulty lies
in “[i]ndividualizing its moral effects to generate particular
rights” of an individual to disobey the law or to not have it
enforced against him.24
To try to show that there is not “any good political
argument”25 for this position, Waldron considers the effect on
legitimacy of someone being wrongfully disenfranchised. He
references laws in the United States restricting early voting and
imposing onerous voter ID-requirements. Assuming that these
restrictions unjustifiably prevented people, including a particular
person “Q,” from voting, this in Waldron’s view may be a
“deplorable state of affairs.”26 Still, Waldron continues,
few people believe that any of the laws enacted by the
legislature (to whose membership Q’s vote might have made
the sort of difference that individual votes make in elections)
are rendered illegitimate . . . so far as Q is concerned. No one
thinks Q now has the right to disobey the laws or not have
them enforced against him. His disenfranchisement may make
the democracy poorer, and Q certainly has a justified
complaint; but nothing follows about legitimacy and
enforcement so far as his relation to the laws is concerned.27

Waldron asserts that if nothing follows about the morality
of enforcement of the laws against Q in the “relatively
formalized context of voting,” then it cannot “possibly be true”
that restriction on P’s participation in the “diffuse free-wheeling
debate” that characterizes public discourse could create any
legitimacy problem in enforcing a downstream law against P.28
As I shall discuss in detail in a moment, Waldron’s
disenfranchisement scenario is in a crucial respect disanalogous
to the circumstances under which I claim that a speech
restriction can render immoral the enforcement of a downstream
law. But first I think it would be useful to bring to the surface

23. Id.
24. Id.. As discussed, supra, text accompanying notes 10 to 14, by problematically
describing his disagreement with me as centering on whether upstream speech
restrictions can create “rights” in people not to have downstream laws enforced against
them or to disobey these laws, Waldron may exaggerate somewhat the extent of this
disagreement.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 710.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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and then contest a crucial assumption underlying Waldron’s
argument.
Waldron assumes that voting is categorically more essential
to political legitimacy than is participation in public discourse.
Such a hierarchy is implicit in Waldron’s assertion that if the
disenfranchisement of Q does not raise legitimacy concerns, then
a restriction on P’s participation in public discourse could “not
possibly” do so. Waldron does not purport to make a sustained
argument in support of this view. Instead, he emphasizes that
although an individual’s contribution to “the swirling maelstrom
of informal debate” might have some effect on “things that are
said and votes that are cast in the legislature,”29 there is no
guarantee that it will have any effect whatsoever. This is
because, as Waldron explains: “My letter to the newspaper may
not be published; there may be no hits on my blog; eyes may be
turned away from my graffiti; my spoken words may disappear
into the wind; perhaps no one will turn up for the meetings I
organize; and the leaflets I distribute may end up in the
gutter . . . .”30
It is true that an individual’s contribution to public
discourse will often have no effect on the legislative process, on
who is elected to the legislature, or in persuading other
individuals about matters of public concern. However, it is also
true that an individual vote will almost never make a difference
to the outcome of the election.31 Moreover, while most
contributions to public discourse will when viewed in isolation
have no effect on society’s collective decisions, and few will have
more than negligible effect, sometimes an individual
contribution, such as a blog post that goes viral or a particularly
persuasive newspaper column, can have a marked effect on the
outcome of such decisions. In contrast, a single vote can never
make such a disproportionate contribution to the result of a
29. Id. at 708. In limiting the importance of public discourse to its ability to
persuade members of the legislature on how to vote, Waldron’s conception of the
purpose of freedom of expression is remarkably, and in my view, unjustifiably narrow.
For one, it ignores the interest of a speaker in confirming “his or her standing as a
responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action.” Dworkin, supra
note 9, at vii.
30. Waldron supra note 2, at 707.
31. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Waldron vaguely refers to Q’s vote as
one that “might have made the sort of difference that individual votes make in
elections.” Id. at 710.
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collective decision. So even if the key measure of the
legitimating function were, as Waldron suggests, the effect on
collective decision making,32 it is not at all clear that public
discourse ranks lower than voting.
But more significantly, even if it were the case that voting
was categorically more important to legitimation than
participation in public discourse, Waldron’s disenfranchisement
scenario cannot do the work he intends for it. The type of voting
restriction Waldron references is simply not analogous to the
viewpoint-discriminatory laws that I argue can render the
enforcement of a downstream law immoral as applied to
particular individuals.33 While Waldron stipulates that the voting
restrictions in his scenario are unjustified, he does not posit that
they were intended to disenfranchise Q or anyone else on
account of ideology or for holding a viewpoint on a particular
issue.34
32. Accord, ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED 31–42 (2014). Note that
Waldron’s minimalistic view of the legitimation of free speech as compared to the
legislative process would apply not just to particular downstream laws but to systemic
legitimacy as well.
33. Waldron’s scenario is inapt in another way. It examines the effect of
disenfranchisement on a species of systemic legitimacy, that is, on all the laws passed in a
particular legislative session. My concern, in contrast, is with the effect of speech
restrictions on particular downstream laws. Waldron curiously claims that I am “not
happy with this systemic approach to legitimacy.” Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. Far
from being unhappy with such an approach, in a previous article on freedom of
expression and political legitimacy I emphasized how viewpoint-based speech restrictions
can undermine systemic legitimacy. See James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political
Legitimacy: A Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2011). The reservation
that I expressed in my Opening Article was that the damage to systemic legitimacy
claimed to be caused by hate speech itself is incommensurable with, or at least very
difficult to compare to, the detriment to legitimacy of particular laws that I assert can be
caused by hate speech restrictions. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 577. Waldron’s
scenario suffers from a similar problem. An isolated deprivation of the equal opportunity
to participate in the political process, be it from a voting or a speech restriction, will have
a negligible effect on the entire political system or, as in Waldron’s scenario, even on the
entirety of the laws passed during a legislative session. As such, his scenario tells us little
about, and in any event is hard to compare to, the effect that a deprivation of the equal
opportunity to participate in the political process might have on the legitimacy of a
particular law. Cf. infra note 36 and the scenario in text accompanying it.
34. Interestingly, it has been alleged that some actual restrictions on early voting or
ID-requirements were in fact imposed to disenfranchise people because of their political
affiliation or even race. David A. Graham, North Carolina’s Deliberate
Disenfranchisement of Black Voters, THE ATLANTIC (July 29, 2016), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/north-carolina-voting-rights-law/493649.
Such
motivation would, of course, raise greater legitimacy concerns than in Waldron’s
scenario, and perhaps this is why he didn’t mention it. Indeed, disenfranchisement on the
basis of race can have a ruinous effect on systemic legitimacy. For this reason, I think a
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A much more analogous scenario would be voting
restrictions for an upcoming city council election cleverly
designed to disenfranchise as many people as possible who
oppose an increase in the property tax. Under such
circumstances, I would think that Q1, disenfranchised because of
her opposition to the tax increase, would have a very good claim
that a law passed by the newly-elected city council raising the tax
on her property was immoral. And this would be true even if the
property owner could not show that but for her particular
disenfranchisement the city council would have not passed the
tax increase. By the same token, P1, who was able to vote in the
city council election but who was forbidden by law from
speaking out against the tax increase in “the maelstrom of
informal debate” would, like Q1,35 also have a strong moral
objection to the application of the tax increase to her.36
good case could be made that the longstanding practice of disenfranchising AfricanAmericans in various jurisdictions in the United States until the latter part of the
twentieth century rendered the entire legal system in these jurisdictions illegitimate as to
these disenfranchised citizens, making immoral the application to them of all laws which
with people could have reasonably disagreed. As a result, such disenfranchisement
arguably gave those disenfranchised people a moral right to, in Waldron’s terminology,
“rise up in revolution.” Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 332. Shiffrin
suggests that the current American legal system is illegitimate, particularly as regards
African-Americans. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 679-80. He therefore concludes that “[i]f
revolution is not justified in the United States, it is not that the government is worthy of
our respect” but because of “pacifist principles” or that such a revolution would “be
unsuccessful or cause more harm than good.” Id. at 679 n.19. I wholeheartedly agree with
Shiffrin that there are currently very serious deficits in the legitimacy of the legal system
in the United States, including the existence of government “lobbyists for the rich at the
expense of the poor” and “police departments with cultures designed to cover up the
police murders of people.” Id. at 679–80. Contrary to Shiffrin, however, I do not believe
that the deficits in the current legal system justify revolution even by those most
aggrieved. This is in no small part because of the right of every American to express
virtually any view in public discourse, including vehement condemnation of the police, as
well as the right of each citizen to cast an equally-weighted vote. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. The moral of this story is obvious: Waldron should mind better his “Ps and Qs.”
36. Concededly, the hypothetical ban on publicly opposing the tax increase
obviously curtails the ability of speakers to express their views on a particular subject
more than does even the most restrictive hate speech provision currently in force in any
democratic country. It therefore would have far more detrimental effect on the
legitimacy of downstream legislation than do hate speech laws. As explained above, I
want as much as possible in this Part to put to one side the issue of hate speech bans, as
Waldron largely does in the part of his response challenging my basic premise that
speech restrictions have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the enforcement of
downstream laws against particular individuals. The hypothetical, then, is not offered as
comparable to hate speech bans but rather only to show that if the speech restriction is
severe enough, it can indeed have the ruinous effect on downstream legislation that
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Waldron correctly notes that the crux of my claim that
speech restrictions can render the enforcement of downstream
laws immoral is the basic precept that “‘each individual in
society is of equal moral worth and therefore is entitled to have
his or her interests treated with equal respect by the
government.’”37 But it is precisely this equality concern that is
missing from Waldron’s disenfranchisement scenario. From an
equality perspective, it is one thing to be disenfranchised by
unnecessarily burdensome restrictions on early voting or
unreasonably onerous ID-requirements;38 it is quite another to
be disenfranchised because of one’s position on a particular
collective decision. In my view, there comes a point at which a
speech restriction, like selective disenfranchisement, can so
profoundly disrespect both the interests and equal moral worth
of some individuals that the restriction can have an effect not
just on the legitimacy of the legal system39 but also on particular
laws enforced against those whose ability to oppose these laws
was severely curtailed.40
Waldron apparently41 rejects my equality argument on the
grounds that even if a speech restriction were to disrespect a
particular interest of the would-be speaker, there is a host of
other interests “to be served by our laws” such as “health care,
Waldron denies that it can. Whether under certain circumstances hate speech bans can
have such an effect is a question that I address in Part II.
37. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711 (quoting Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536).
38. Such voting restrictions are analogous to unreasonably burdensome contentneutral time, place and manner restrictions. Although these restrictions can unduly
impair the right to participate in public discourse, see, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171 (1983) (invalidating law prohibiting demonstrations on sidewalk in front of
Supreme Court building), they ordinarily do not raise the equality concerns presented by
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on free speech.
39. Waldron seems to accept, or at least does not deny, that such a speech
restriction could have such an effect. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711.
40. Waldron correctly notes that I do not take a position on whether an upstream
speech restriction can affect the application of a downstream law to persons who had no
desire to speak out against it. Since I wanted in my analysis to focus on the impact that
viewpoint-based laws might have on the interests of speakers or would-be speakers to
participate in public discourse, I did not consider the impact that such speech restrictions
might have on audience interests. For such a discussion, see James Weinstein, Speech
Categorization and the Limits of Free Speech Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1117-33 (2004).
41. I say “apparently” because at this point in his analysis, Waldron is focusing on
the effect of hate speech bans on the interests of racists restrained by such laws. I think
though it is a fair inference that Waldron would come to the same conclusion as to any
speech restriction that could conceivably be enacted in any contemporary liberal
democracy.

11 - WEINSTEIN REPLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

728

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/1/17 9:59 AM

[Vol. 32:715

education, roads, housing” which the speech restriction does not
implicate.42 That there are numerous interests not affected by
the speech restrictions explains why in mature, stable
democracies even the most restrictive viewpoint-discriminatory
speech restriction does not come anywhere close to destroying
the legitimacy of the entire legal system.43 But the existence of
all these other legally-conferred benefits, while relevant to the
measure of a legal system’s legitimacy, does little to ameliorate
the damage to a citizen’s ability to protect those interests
associated with a particular downstream law arising from an
upstream speech restriction.
Believing that concern for the interests of the would-be
speaker will not yield the detrimental effect I claim that speech
restrictions can have on downstream laws, Waldron concludes
that the essence of my equality concern must be about “respect
for opinions.”44 “The main way in which we express people’s
opinions in the political process,” Waldron insists, “is by
counting their votes, and we do count the votes of those whose
free expression is impacted” by speech restrictions.45 So in the
end we have come full circle: it is primarily Waldron’s
disagreement with my view about the legitimating power of free
speech as compared to voting, not some basic conceptual flaw in
my argument, that leads him to reject my view about the
42. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711.
43. Though it might slightly reduce the “reservoir” of the legal system’s legitimacy.
See Weinstein, supra note 33, at 368 n.24 (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY:
PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 148–49 (1971)). Despite my explicitly making this
point in my Opening Article, see Weinstein, supra note 1, at 574 n.165, Heinze seems to
read me as contending that viewpoint-based speech restrictions on public discourse can
destroy the legitimacy of the entire legal system as to that citizen. “For Weinstein—
although this is not exactly his phrasing—a democracy that excludes citizens from
democratic opinion formation effectively dissolves its social contract with them, relieving
them of their duty to obey law.” Heinze, supra note 3, at 638. See also supra note 9
(discussing Heinze’s view that Dworkin was concerned with the effect of hate speech
restrictions on systemic legitimacy). For there to be any such catastrophic consequence,
the democratic deprivation would have to be far greater in scope and impact than any
speech restriction currently in force or likely to be enacted in any contemporary mature
and stable democracy. See supra note 34 (arguing that the longstanding practice of
disenfranchising African-Americans in various jurisdictions in the United States until the
latter part of the twentieth century may have rendered the entire legal system in these
jurisdictions illegitimate as to these disenfranchised citizens).
44. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711. In my Opening Article, I explained that
“[i]ndividuals . . . are entitled to participate as political equals not just to vindicate their
personal interests narrowly defined, but also in deciding what in their judgment is best
for society as a whole.” Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536.
45. Waldron, supra note 2, at 711.
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potentially detrimental effects that speech restrictions might
have on the legitimacy of downstream legislation. Indeed, I
suspect herein lies much of the reason for our differing views
about the propriety of hate speech bans in a free and democratic
society.
B. OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE BASIC CLAIM
1.

Rule-of-Law Problems

Waldron says that he is worried that my view that an
upstream speech restriction can render immoral the enforcement
of downstream laws against some people but not others “may get
tangled up in Rule-of-Law issues about generality.”46 He notes
that speech restrictions are usually quite general and although
they may be designed to be enforced against only certain
speakers, “they have a potential impact on everyone’s speech.”47
As a result, he fears “it may be hard to identify the basis for in
personam illegitimacy of the type” that I suggest.48
I agree that my argument raises rule-of-law issues and not
just the one that Waldron notes. In addition to the identification
problem he worries about, there is the equal justice concern of a
particular class of people possibly being exempted from
obligations imposed on everyone else in society. But if I am right
that upstream speech restrictions can render the application of
downstream laws immoral, then criticizing my argument for any
rule-of-law problems resulting from this unfortunate
consequence is a classic case of “shooting the messenger.” Surely
the blame for any such problems lies with the speech restrictions.
In any event, these rule-of-law problems are essentially no
different than the ones that commonly arise when general laws
provide exemptions for a certain class people, e.g., those with
religious objections to the law, or when courts find that
exemptions are required by constitutional provisions, such as
guaranteeing the free exercise of religion. In both instances,
there is the problem of identifying who is eligible for the
exemption and justifying the impact on the equal administration
of the laws arising from the exemption.
46.
47.
48.

Waldron, supra note 2, at 706.
Id.
Id.
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In fact, any-rule-of law issues raised by my argument are
less problematic than the exemptions from general law just
discussed. Aside from providing a reason against the enactment
of viewpoint-discriminatory laws, the only other practical
consequence of my analysis is to detect instances in which the
enforcement of a downstream law may have been rendered
immoral by an upstream speech restriction. As I have explained,
however, this does not necessarily mean that the law should not
be enforced.49 And where the law will be enforced despite the
moral deficit, there is, unlike with granting an exemption, no
need to identify with precision those against whom enforcement
of the law would be immoral.50
2.

The Relationship between the Justification of a Speech
Restriction and its Effect on Political Legitimacy

I concluded my Opening Article by arguing that the
untoward effects that hate speech restrictions have on the
legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws “weigh[] against such
upstream constraints.”51 In his Commentary, Professor Steven
Shiffrin succinctly offers a powerful conceptual challenge not
just to this specific conclusion regarding hate speech laws but
also to the significance of my entire position as it relates to
49. See supra text accompanying note 14.
50. Heinze argues that any attempt to limit my argument to downstream laws
“‘directly’ related to the proscribed speech, such as laws imposing upon employers
various non-discrimination norms contrary to the viewpoints of excluded hate speakers”
is “too arbitrary.” Heinze, supra note 3, at 644. In his view, once a citizen is excluded
“pro tanto from public discourse, there is no area of law to which that exclusion becomes
irrelevant in principle.” He gives an example of an anti-Semite who believes that “Jews
run the world” and who thus can connect that belief to “any legal norm or practice,”
including the speech limit or the tax on cigarettes. I am not sure I see the problem. If an
anti-Semite were prohibited from giving as his reason for opposing certain laws his
authentically held belief they were masterminded by a Jewish conspiracy for the benefit
of Jews, then such a speech restriction would most likely damage the descriptive
legitimacy of those laws as applied to this bigot and in certain situations impair, and
perhaps even on a very rare occasion destroy, normative legitimacy as well. This
potential damage would usually be less if a bigot did not want to speak out against a
particular law or laws but was nonetheless prohibited from expressing the view that all
laws and policies in his jurisdiction are unduly influenced by a group of people. And of
course, many of those wanting to engage in hate speech, or expression that many believe
to be hate speech such as proclaiming that homosexual conduct is immoral, do not have
such “a comprehensively conspiratorial world view.” Id.
51. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 582. I added that if there were non-coercive
measures that had not yet been tried to combat the alienating effect of hate speech that
Waldron described, then this argument “weighs heavily” against the propriety of hate
speech laws in a free and democratic society. Id at 583.
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normative legitimacy. “If hate speech restrictions are
justifiable,” Shiffrin writes, “then their enforcement cannot
undermine the normative legitimacy of anti-discrimination
laws.”52 If, on the other hand, “such restrictions are not
justifiable,” Shiffrin contends, “then the impact on antidiscrimination laws is interesting, but not central to the case
against them.”53 For this reason, Shiffrin characterizes my
argument as “an instance of the tail wagging the dog.”54 Waldron
makes a similar argument, observing that since “it is only
unjustified restrictions on speech that affect [normative]
legitimacy, then it looks as though we will have to settle the
question of justification first, before we assess the impact on
legitimacy.”55 He adds that for this reason “the argument about
legitimacy can hardly be cited as a reason for thinking” that an
upstream law is inappropriate.56
There are two problems with this interesting conceptual
challenge. First, it mistakenly assumes that whether a law is
justified is an all-or-nothing proposition, when as Waldron
helpfully emphasized regarding the effect of speech restrictions
on legitimacy, “the legitimacy of any given law is itself a matter
of degree.”57 Relatedly, the argument ignores the iterative
nature of the process for determining whether a law is justified.
To say that a law or a proposed law is justified means that
there are better reasons for the law (its benefits) than there are
reasons against it (its costs).58 So while in the final analysis a law
is either justified or it is not, it is also the case that some laws are
better justified than others. With respect to speech restrictions
that are extremely well justified, Shiffrin and Waldron are surely
correct that such constraints can have no detrimental effect on
normative legitimacy. To borrow a venerable example from
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a law punishing falsely crying
“fire!” with the intent of causing a panic59 would have no impact
52. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 675.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Waldron, supra note 2, at 712.
56. Id.
57. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 333.
58. I am referring here to moral as opposed to legal justification. Even an immoral
law might as a matter of positive law be legally justified in the sense, for instance, that it
comports with constitutional constraints. See infra note 62.
59. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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on normative legitimacy. In contrast, speech restrictions that on
balance may be justified because they are necessary to prevent
serious harm but nonetheless trench upon core free speech
interests undoubtedly can have serious detrimental effects on
descriptive legitimacy. And it could be argued that such laws
impair normative legitimacy to some extent as well.60
Consider, for instance, the Smith Act,61 a law passed early in
the Cold War banning advocacy of the overthrow of the United
States government by force of violence. While I do not believe
this law was justified, many thoughtful people, including a
majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court,62
believed that it was. But even if this law was justified, the cost to
freedom of expression cannot be seriously doubted. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter candidly acknowledged in voting to uphold the
convictions of the leaders of the American Communist Party for
conspiring to engage in advocacy forbidden under the Smith Act:
[C]oupled with such advocacy is criticism of defects in our
society. . . . [Moreover, suppressing] advocates of overthrow
inevitably will also silence critics who do not advocate
overthrow but fear that their criticism may be so
construed. . . . [It] is self-delusion to think that we can punish
[the defendants] for their advocacy without adding to the risks
60. Consistent with this view, in my Opening Article I concluded that despite their
viewpoint-discriminatory effect, hate speech laws limited to prohibiting use of highly
vituperative language such as referring to members of minority groups as “rats” or
cockroaches” or other animals “‘we would normally seek to exterminate’” to “stir up
racial hatred” might in some circumstance be “adequately justified.” Weinstein, supra
note 1, at 547–48. Contrary to Waldron, however, I contended such laws nonetheless had
some non-trivial effect on normative legitimacy, though not enough to “substantially
diminish” anyone’s political obligation to obey a downstream antidiscrimination law and
“not nearly substantial enough to nullify the large moral benefit” of preventing landlords
from refusing housing to people based or their race or ethnicity. Id. at 548. Importantly,
this assessment was made on the assumption that these laws would in actual operation
precisely target just such highly vituperative speech. Accordingly, I assumed for the sake
of argument that these laws would not substantially impair the ability of individuals
without excessive vituperation to express opposition to antidiscrimination measures or to
criticize the people these measures are meant to protect. Consistent with what I say
below, if experience showed that these laws were in actual operation applied in a way
that substantially interfered with such expression to the detriment of political legitimacy
of these downstream laws, then the justification of the upstream speech restriction would
need to be reevaluated.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
62. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Of course, the Court’s decision to
uphold the law and affirm these convictions means only that a majority of the Justices
thought the law was constitutionally justified. But there can be little doubt that several of
the Justices also thought that the law was morally justified.
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run by loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the
reforms these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that in
sustaining the convictions before us we can hardly escape
restrictions on the interchange of ideas.63

So even if the Smith Act was justified, by chilling honest
criticism of “defects in [American] society,” the law nonetheless
had a detrimental effect on the legitimizing function of freedom
of expression, certainly in the descriptive sense, and arguably in
the normative sense as well.64 Similarly, even if the restriction on
core political speech imposed a century and a half earlier by the
Alien and Sedition Act was justified, as Waldron has suggested,65
the law damaged descriptive legitimacy66 and arguably negatively
affected normative legitimacy. So it is not at all certain, as
Waldron and Shiffrin assert, that only unjustified laws can have a
detrimental effect on normative legitimacy.67 Rather, the better
view may be that if speech restriction justification is a close call,
the law can impair normative as well as descriptive legitimacy.
There is, however, a contrary view with considerable force.
If under the best assessments that can be made at any particular
time a law is justified, then, so are any costs, including the
“chilling effect,” it may impose.68 On this view, if the Smith Act
and Alien and Sedition Act were justified, then even the
considerable cost to descriptive legitimacy, though regrettable,

63. Id. at 549 (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
64. The damage here was to systemic legitimacy both “in rem” and even more
acutely “in personam” as to those “loyal citizens” whose speech was deterred by the
Smith Act.
65. Jeremy Waldron, Free Speech & the Menace of Hysteria, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
May 29, 2008, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2008/05/29/free-speech-the-menace-ofhysteria/ (reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE:
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2008)).
66. See Post, supra note 3, at 652.
67. Interestingly, Waldron seems to concede that Britain’s hate speech laws, which
he obviously thinks are very well justified, could have a “minimal effect on legitimacy.”
Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335. So wouldn’t it follow that a justbarely justified law could have a greater impact on legitimacy? (In fairness to Waldron,
he also has characterized the loss of legitimacy caused by Britain’s hate speech laws as
“minimal or nonexistent.” WALDRON, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 183 (emphasis
added)). In any event, Waldron previously seems to have thought the question of the
relationship between justification of a speech restriction and its effect on the legitimacy
of downstream laws was not quite as clear cut as he now claims it to be.
68. By way of analogy, if a bombing campaign as part of a just war is morally
justified, then so is all collateral damage that could not have been avoided with the
exercise of due care. On this view, while the collateral damage is regrettable, it is not
immoral.
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was not wrongful and thus did not damage normative legitimacy.
But even on this view, a law’s justification is not a static, oneshot determination but is rather a dynamic and continuous
process. So even if Waldron is right that we will “have to settle
the question of justification first, before we assess the impact on
legitimacy,” he fails to take into account that any determination
about whether a law is justified, especially one made before a
law goes into effect, must be open to revision in light of
information about its actual operation. With respect to speech
restrictions, such reevaluation would include how effective the
law has been in preventing the harm thought to be caused by the
restricted speech as well as whether the law has been misapplied,
thereby having a greater “chilling effect” on non-targeted speech
than anticipated.
In my Opening Article, I cited a number of cases in which
hate speech laws were applied, or misapplied, to speech that
must be allowed in any free and democratic society and thus
wrongfully punished people for participating in public discourse.
In addition, as a result of such misapplication, would-be speakers
were likely wrongfully deterred from engaging in this public
debate in ways likely not accurately predicted in the initial
assessments of whether these laws were justified.69 In light of this
new information, the justification of at least those hate speech
laws that have been applied in this way, and perhaps all those of
its genus, should be reevaluated in light of the detrimental effect
on legitimacy.70
There is another reason for reevaluation of the justification
of hate speech laws and hence their potential impact on
normative legitimacy. Even according to its harshest critic, the
claim that upstream speech restrictions can deprive downstream
laws of political legitimacy is a novel one.71 Accordingly, if this
claim has any validity, then the justification of hate speech laws

69. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–58.
70. So if in the bombing campaign scenario posited in note 68 supra it was
determined after several air raids both that the civilian casualties were far greater than
anticipated and that the strategic value of the target was less than originally thought,
continued raids might well be immoral at least in the absence of increased precautions
against collateral damage.
71. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. More generally, as Waldron notes,
legitimacy is neglected in political theory. Waldron, supra note 2, at 698.
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should be reassessed to evaluate the possibility of untoward
effects of these laws that had not been previously considered.72
Professor Eric Heinze’s Commentary also raises the
relationship between justification and legitimacy, though in a
very different way than Shiffrin’s and Waldron’s critiques. The
burden of Heinze’s learned Commentary is to show that
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on public discourse such as
hate speech bans are illegitimate.73 Problematically, he
repeatedly attributes this view to me,74 and at one point even
refers to it as my “thesis.”75 My thesis, however, focuses not on
the legitimacy of upstream laws that impose constraints on
public discourse, as does Heinze’s Commentary, but rather on
the effect that these constraints might have on the legitimacy of
downstream legislation. In my Opening Article I contended that
the potentially baleful effect that hate speech restrictions could
have on downstream legislation “weighs against” the propriety,
i.e., the justification, of such laws in a free and democratic
society.76 I said nothing about the legitimacy of such speech
restrictions themselves. And surely just because a law, on
balance, is not adequately justified does not mean that it is also
illegitimate, at least not in the sense that I have used the term.
Concededly, because of the negative impact that such speech
restrictions have on democracy it may well be that inadequately
justified viewpoint-discriminatory laws are illlegitimate under
some accepted definition of that term. This is an interesting

72. By the same token, those of us who are skeptical that hate speech laws are
justifiable in mature, stable democracies should be open to revising views in light of new
empirical evidence as well as new arguments, or better argued versions of old ones.
While I remain skeptical about the operation in actual practice of even hate speech laws
limited to highly vituperative racist expression, Waldron’s arguments have persuaded me
that as a theoretical matter such bans might be justified. And as I make clear in Part II of
this Reply, if there were persuasive evidence that hate speech in public discourse was
actually deterring a significant number of members of some vulnerable minority group
from participating in public discourse, I would be open to the propriety of even broader
hate speech laws after all reasonably available alternatives to speech suppressive
measures had been tried and found wanting.
73. Heinze thus begins his Commentary by stating that “[d]emocracy is the ongoing
product of public discussion” and then asking “[w]ith what legitimacy, then, can a
democracy limit its citizens’ participation in that discussion?” Heinze, supra note 3, at
631. See also id. at 633, 636, 639, 643, 645, and 649.
74. Id. at 632, 638, 644.
75. Id. at 644.
76. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 582.
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question worthy of exploration. But with so many other issues to
consider in this Symposium, it is not one I chose to investigate.
C. CHALLENGES TO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE CLAIM
On an understanding of normative legitimacy as “a
fundamentally non-consequentialist and non-instrumental idea”
as well as one focusing “primarily on procedure in the broadest
sense of that word,” Professor Frederick Schauer agrees that my
view about free speech and normative legitimacy seems “largely
correct.”77 Specifically, on such an understanding he agrees that
“allowing people to object to policies with which they disagree is
a necessary component of normative legitimacy, and thus of the
warrant of the state to enforce its directive by coercive means.”78
His one caveat is that it is “plausible” to argue that so long as
citizens have the right to choose who will represent them, the
“right of the citizen to speak out” is not a necessary condition of
democratic legitimacy.79 Schauer mentions this possible
objection in order to emphasize that “a strong and continuous
right to freedom of speech is not entailed by the very idea of
democracy, at least as long as the idea of representative
democracy is not an oxymoron.”80 Despite this observation,
however, Schauer acknowledges that it is “difficult to imagine a
process of selecting representatives or policies that is not
crucially facilitated by direct citizen speech” and that it is even
“more difficult” to envision a government that “does not permit
those people to participate in policy-making outside of the
episodic process of voting.”81 He thus concludes that “freedom
of speech is arguably simply part of the definition of what
democracy and democratic legitimacy just are.”82
Given the role that public opinion plays in determining the
results of collective decisions in every democratic society that
exists in the world today, I have no sympathy for the view that
the right of the people to elect their representatives is alone
sufficient to legitimize the use of coercion to enforce these
77. Schauer, supra note 3, at 663.
78. Id. at 662–63.
79. Id. at 663.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 664. Schauer is not sure how “translating this basic proposition of
normative political philosophy into the language of ‘legitimacy’ adds very much” but
acknowledges that this objection is basically a “terminological quibble.” Id.
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decisions. It was therefore useful for someone with a bit more
sympathy for this position to present it—and then largely refute
it. This is especially true since my principal interlocutor seems to
have a lot of sympathy for this position.83
With respect to free speech and descriptive (or sociological)
legitimacy, Schauer thinks it “entirely reasonable” for me to
conclude based upon extrapolation from empirical studies that
people claim to be more willing to comply with laws with which
they disagree if they have had an opportunity to publicly express
their disagreement with these measures.84 Still, Schauer notes
that the empirical research on which I rely “stops short of
answering the ultimate question—will people who claim to
believe in the obligation to obey laws with which they disagree,
and who in fact believe that they have an obligation to obey such
laws, actually obey such laws”?85 Schauer correctly observes that
just because people believe a course of action is proper does not
mean that they will in in fact follow that belief. He thinks that
this is especially true where there are “temptation[s]” to deviate
from that belief. Since disagreement with a law is such a
“temptation,” Schauer concludes that the “abstract belief” in
obeying such laws may well be overwhelmed in “actual
practice.”86 Because we lack empirical evidence that the belief
that a law ought to be obeyed translates into compliance with
the law, in Schauer’s view all we really can say about the effect
of free speech on this crucial question regarding descriptive
legitimacy is that “we do not know.”87
I agree with Schauer that I did not attend carefully enough
to the distinction between belief in complying with a
disagreeable law and actually doing so. I did not mean to claim,
as a statement in my Opening Article can reasonably be read as
suggesting,88 that there was a perfect or even a strong

83. See supra text accompanying note 19.
84. Id. at 671.
85. Id. at 672.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 673.
88. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 537 n.42 (“studies find that people’s increased
belief in their having an obligation to obey the law results in their voluntary compliance
with the law.”). Even my slightly more nuanced statement that “the weakening of this
sense of obligation would likely lead to less compliance with the law,” id. at 547 n.82,
overstates for the reason Schauer gives what can fairly be inferred from the empirical
evidence.
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correspondence between such belief and practice. Contrary to
Schauer, however, I think we can with some confidence conclude
that to some as yet unascertained extent there is, though
certainly not in every case, a causal connection between such
belief and actual compliance. To use Schauer’s example, a
person’s belief that he should lose weight is certainly no
guarantee that he will do so given temptations such as the ready
availability of tasty, highly caloric food.89 But all things held
equal, including those temptations, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that the people who have a belief that they should lose
weight are more likely to do so than those who have no such
belief.
As I noted in my Opening Article, Schauer has in recent
work helpfully clarified what it means to “obey the law”90 and
has usefully criticized empirical studies for their confusion on
this issue.91 I am pleased that Schauer has used his Commentary
in this Symposium to further advance his important project.
Like Schauer’s commentary, Dean Robert Post’s
contribution focuses on descriptive legitimacy.92 But unlike
Schauer, he chooses to concentrate on the damage speech
restrictions, including hate speech bans, can have on systemic
legitimacy as opposed to the legitimacy of particular laws. In
Part II, I will discuss Post’s incisive discussion of the impact of
speech restrictions on systemic legitimacy. But here I want to
engage the few brief comments he does make about the

89. Schauer, supra note 3, at 672.
90. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 534 n.25.
91. Id. at 537 n.43.
92. Post, supra note 3. Indeed, because he considers the question of normative
legitimacy to be properly within the realm of moral philosophers, not legal scholars, Post
eschews this inquiry altogether. To the extent that Post means to imply that it is not
properly within the scope of a legal scholar’s bailiwick to consider how normative
legitimacy might be affected by speech restrictions, I respectfully disagree. Free speech
issues are suffused with normativity. Though always of some relevance, the deep moral
underpinnings of free speech sometimes properly remain submerged, such as with highly
technical inquiries about doctrinal fit. At other times, however, consideration of the
normative core becomes crucial, such as in attempting to explain, as I try to do in this
Symposium, why democratic self-governance is a vital free speech value. As a
preeminent legal scholar has written: “The normative essence of democracy is thus
located in the communicative processes necessary to instill a sense of selfdetermination.” Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 282 (1991). Following Post’s lead, I endeavor in this
Symposium to elucidate this essence.
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potential of speech restrictions to undercut the legitimacy of
particular downstream laws.
Post agrees that it “is conceivable that regulations of speech
might undermine the descriptive legitimacy of specific laws.”93
With respect to hate speech bans, for instance, he believes that if
such restrictions are “capaciously interpreted” in the
“distressingly broad ways” that my Opening Article shows they
can be, then downstream antidiscrimination measures “may well
suffer from diminished legitimacy” by making those prevented
from expressing opposition to the law likely to regard the laws as
“unfairly enacted.”94 Nonetheless, Post considers the detrimental
effect on legitimacy might have on individual laws as “a
complicated and largely idiosyncratic question.”95 He contends
that “[i]ndividual laws become descriptively illegitimate
primarily because they are mismatched to the mores of the
population to which they are applied.”96 As examples, Post
recalls that the Constitutional Amendment establishing
Prohibition in the United States was widely regarded as
illegitimate in the Northeast, while the Amendment prohibiting
racial discrimination in voting was long treated as illegitimate in
the South.97
The idiosyncratic nature of descriptive legitimacy of
individual laws that Post notes, however, has to do with
profound disagreement about the substance of laws. The damage
to legitimacy that can result from speech restrictions, in contrast,
is a procedural concern arising from the curtailment of the ability
of dissenters to express opposition to the law. Though the
opposition to the substance of various laws might be
idiosyncratic, there is nothing idiosyncratic about the feeling that
a law has been “unfairly enacted” because one’s ability to
oppose it was selectively curtailed. These feelings are no more
idiosyncratic than those of “persons of widely varying views”
coming to “distrust a political system that holds out the promise
of self-determination but that refuses to hear what [they] have to
say.”98
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Post, supra note 3, at 652.
Id. at 653–54.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id. at 656–57.
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I accept, as Post implies, that it might be “complicated” to
disentangle the damage to descriptive legitimacy caused by the
speech restriction from that resulting from vehement opposition
to the substance of the law. But as Post correctly recognizes,
unlike detriments to normative legitimacy, damage to descriptive
legitimacy does not support arguments that there is no
obligation to obey the law.99 Accordingly, the procedural and
substantive elements need not be neatly sorted out to appreciate
that curtailing the ability of citizens to express opposition to a
law can greatly exacerbate damage to descriptive legitimacy
arising from profound disagreement with the law’s substance.
II. HATE SPEECH BANS AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
In this Part, I will respond to criticisms that I have
exaggerated the extent to which hate speech bans have impaired
citizens’ ability to participate as equals in public discourse, while
at the same time failed to appreciate the effect that hate speech
itself has on political legitimacy. But before doing so it might be
useful to clear up some possible misconceptions about the goals
of my Opening Article as well as about my position on hate
speech regulation more generally.
A. THE GOALS OF THE OPENING ARTICLE
First, I want to emphasize that the primary purpose of my
Opening Article was to expand and explore in detail the
argument, stated only cursorily in previous works, that upstream
speech restriction could damage, and potentially even destroy,
the legitimacy of downstream legislation.100 For the reasons
explained above,101 I chose to use hate speech bans as the
exemplar of speech restrictions that could have this baneful
effect.102 Though the discussion has to some significant extent
shifted in that direction, it was not my intent in my Opening
Article to engage in a comprehensive discussion of the
99. Id. at 653–54.
100. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 541 (“It is the thesis of this article that the
infringement of this fundamental interest of equal political participation can have severe
consequences not just for the legitimacy of the legal system but also for individual
downstream laws.”).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 4 to 5.
102. I noted that other types of speech restrictions, such as blasphemy laws and bans
on glorifying terrorism or aiding terrorist organizations, also have the potential to
undercut the legitimacy of downstream laws. Id. at 541 n.60.
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arguments for or against hate speech regulation103 or to argue
that hate speech regulation is “wrong in principle.”104
Professor Katharine Gelber complains that my Opening
Article “lacks a clear conception of hate speech.”105 But precisely
because this article was not meant to be a comprehensive
discussion of the pros and cons of hate speech legislation, I did
not think it necessary to undertake the difficult task of defining
hate speech.106 In any event, the lack of “a clear conception of
hate speech” in the Opening Article seems not to have been
problematic. Crucially, no participant in this Symposium
gainsaid that the speech in my key Evangelical Photographer

103.

For such a discussion, see JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY
RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE (1999). As noted above, the
only overall implication for the hate speech debate that I drew from my analysis is that
the potential damage to the legitimacy of downstream legislation “weighs against” the
propriety of hate speech laws in mature and stable democracies, and “heavily” against
such laws before non-coercive remedies have been exhausted. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
104. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 704. Far from finding hate speech laws wrong in
principle, I wrote in my Opening Article that a legislature could under some
circumstances reasonably conclude that narrow bans on highly vituperative hate speech
of the type that Waldron supports are justified. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 548. My
doubts about such restrictions are not so much theoretical as they are pragmatic. So
Shiffrin is correct in observing that I “might be counted out as a general opponent of hate
speech restrictions.” Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 681. Cf. Heinze, supra note 3, at 635
(arguing that all viewpoint-based restrictions on speech, including hate speech bans, are
contrary to basic democratic principles). Regarding my position on hate speech laws,
Brown writes the impression he gets from my Opening Article is that I “partly” see
defenders of hate speech bans as “defend[ing] the indefensible.” I am not sure what to
make of the oxymoronic qualification “partly.” (Cf. “I partly think that people who
commit hate crimes are deplorable.”) But while I find the breadth of the bans on hate
speech that Brown endorses difficult to square with core democratic principles (see infra
note 186), I don’t find even these restrictions “indefensible” in light of the serious harm
that hate speech is capable of causing even in mature, stable democracies. What I do find
indefensible are certain rationales that have been offered in support of hate speech bans,
including Brown’s use of the precautionary principle to support the “silencing
argument.” See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 757. (I reply in detail below to Brown’s
further attempt to defend his use of the precautionary principle.) For another
indefensible rationale for suppressing hate speech, see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697,
758, in which writing for a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court Justice Robert
George Brian Dickson stated: “Hate propaganda seriously threatens . . . the enthusiasm
with which the value of equality is accepted and acted upon by society.”
105. Gelber, supra note 3, at 619.
106. Apropos the difficulty of this task, Gelber aptly adds “to be fair” that “the lack
of a clear definition of hate speech is in fact part of the problem” that I have with hate
speech laws in actual operation. Id.
AND THE
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Scenario might have been prosecuted in some democratic
jurisdictions as hate speech.107
Similarly, I hope I might be acquitted for not explaining
“the defining features of hate speech, properly understood,”108 by
which Professor Gelber evidently means expression that can and
should be properly banned in a mature and stable democratic
society. While I am open to the possibility that hate speech
restrictions in such societies might under certain circumstances
be appropriate,109 I remain skeptical of their propriety. So asking
me to explain the defining features of hate speech that can be
properly suppressed is not unlike asking an agnostic to explain
the essential characteristics of God.
Having dealt with a possible important misconception of the
intent of my Opening Article, I turn now to Waldron’s
questioning my motive for focusing on the detrimental effects
that hate speech bans can have on political legitimacy. In his
Response, Waldron writes:
Back of all the points I am going to make in this essay
responding to Weinstein is a worry that the argument about
political legitimacy is just being wheeled into the hate speech
107. As discussed below, several participants validly took issue with my using
prosecution of anti-homosexual speech under Section 5 of the UK’s Public Order Act,
which as I made clear is not a hate speech law, to impugn the operation of hate speech
laws. This problem, however, did not derive from lack of a “clear conception” of hate
speech. Similarly, the disagreement between Waldron and me, also discussed below,
about whether the section of the Public Order Act enhancing the penalty for racially or
religiously motivated violations of Section 5 is a hate crime rather than a hate speech
statute, does not stem from uncertainty as to what type of expression constitutes hate
speech.
108. Gelber is mistaken in asserting that I imply “quite strongly” that “two of the
defining features of hate speech, properly understood, are vituperation and the use of
epithets.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 620. Because Waldron focused on these features in his
work, I did so as well, not because I thought that these were “defining features of hate
speech, properly understood” but to engage Waldron on his own terms. It is true that I
concluded that if highly vituperative hate speech could be narrowly targeted with no
substantial chilling effect on those who wanted to express bigoted ideas without
vituperation, such a restriction would have a minimal impact on normative legitimacy.
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545. But as important as the impact on normative legitimacy
is to the calculus on the propriety of banning hate speech, it is still only one of many
factors, including consideration of the impact on descriptive legitimacy which I concluded
could be substantially impaired by even the narrow bans that Waldron supports.
109. For what it’s worth, I agree with my fellow skeptic Robert Post that whether
such restrictions are appropriate depends on “variables like the number of persons in
target groups, the intensity of their sense of exclusion” and whether or not “the ambient
legal and social environment makes members of target groups feel safe and included.”
Post, supra note 3, at 657–58.
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debate opportunistically by people who have never otherwise
shown that they take it seriously. I want to make sure that the
argument is not just being rigged up for the purposes of the
hate speech debate.110

Waldron needn’t have worried. The relationship between
free speech and legitimacy has long been a particular interest of
mine, a connection that I have explored in works far afield from
the “the hate speech debate.”111 For instance, in an article in
another Symposium in this journal, I defended at length political
legitimacy as the normative essence of American free speech
doctrine.112 And far from being “rigged up” to specifically
protect hate speech,113 I emphasized in these previous works that
110. Waldron, supra note 2, at 699–700. See also id. at 706 (suggesting that my
“theory of political legitimacy” is “specifically invented for” the hate speech debate and
“rigged” to yield a certain result.)
111. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Database Protection and the First Amendment, 28 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 305, 317, 327 (2003); Weinstein, supra note 40 at 1104, 1113-15; James
Weinstein, Fools, Knaves and the Protection of Commercial Speech: A Response to
Professor Redish, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV 133, 145 (2007); James Weinstein, Institutional
Review Boards and the Constitution, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 512–13 (2007); James Weinstein,
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498, 509-14 (2011).
112. See Weinstein, supra note 33. But not only is Waldron’s motivational concern
misplaced, it is also odd. Why on earth would any right thinking person want to “rig[] up”
an argument to protect something as noxious as racist, homophobic, or anti-Semitic
expression? To the contrary, the natural temptation would be to “rig” the argument
against the protection of such loathsome expression as evinced, for example, by
Alexander Brown’s invocation of the precautionary principle. See Part II. C. 2, infra. I
would hope that Waldron and other defenders of hate speech legislation would
understand that the motivation for my skepticism of hate speech bans is the concern that
these restrictions and the justifications offered to support them will undermine the
strength of a free speech principle required to adequately protect dissent in a free and
democratic society, including by members of minority groups. See Part II. C. 2, infra. In
this regard, it is worth noting that Mari Matsuda, a prominent supporter of hate speech
bans, decades ago expressed admiration for “the conviction and conviction [of] Jewish
civil libertarians who have eloquently, and at great personal cost, argued for the free
speech rights of Nazis and Klan members.” Although she passionately disagreed with this
position, she recognized that it did not derive from insensitivity to the harms of hate
speech but rather from the belief that “the right of protest [is] essential for the protection
of minorities.” Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2326 (1989).
113. Also giving rise to this worry about “rigging” is Waldron’s erroneous view that
in declining to balance the loss of legitimacy to a particular law against gains to systemic
legitimacy as argued for by Alexander Brown due to incommensurability problems, I was
somehow “dismiss[ing] or ignor[ing]” Brown’s concern and therefore not following “the
legitimacy principle where it leads.” Waldron, supra note 2, at 699–700. Far from
dismissing or ignoring Brown’s concern, I dealt with it at considerable length. See
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 576–78. In addition, to obviate the incommensurability
problem I then built on Brown’s argument to identify a commensurable countervailing
legitimacy concern. Id. at 580–81. Indeed, I concluded this countervailing legitimacy
concern arising from hate speech itself might, like the one I have identified arising from a

11 - WEINSTEIN REPLY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

744

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/1/17 9:59 AM

[Vol. 32:715

the potential for a speech restriction to damage the legitimacy of
downstream legislation applies to any viewpoint-based
restriction on public discourse—be it a restriction on anti-war
speech, opposition to a tax increase, or criticism of a nation’s
immigration policy.114
Finally, I want to dispel any notion that I believe hate
speech is incapable of causing harm beyond profound offense.115
To the contrary, as I have often explained, I believe that even in
a mature, stable democracy hate speech has the potential to
produce any number of much more serious harms including
discrimination and even violence against those denounced by the
bigoted expression.116 In addition, as I explained in my Opening
Article, I agree with Waldron that hate speech can make

hate speech ban, also destroy the legitimacy of a downstream law as applied to members
of this minority group. Id. at 581. Later in this Reply, I will further engage Brown’s
countervailing legitimacy concerns. See infra text accompanying notes 169 to 203. In
addition, now that the discussion has been expanded to also focus on hate speech and
systemic legitimacy, I will try to evaluate the claims that commentators have made about
the effect of both hate speech bans and hate speech itself on the legitimacy of the legal
system. See notes 236 to 245, infra. For unlike the determent of hate speech bans on
particular laws versus the damage of hate speech itself to systemic legitimacy, this
expanded discussion presents commensurable claims. In short, whatever problems there
may be with my view about free speech and legitimacy, I don’t think that failing to follow
“the legitimacy principle where it leads” is one of them.
114. James Weinstein, Extreme Speech, Public Order, and Democracy: Lessons from
the Masses, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 23, 28 (Ivan Hare & James
Weinstein eds., 2009).
115. Shiffrin writes that “a restriction on hate speech is not imposed merely because
government finds the speech disagreeable, disturbing, or offensive as Weinstein
suggests.” Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 677 n.68. This statement is misleading. What I actually
wrote, quoting from an earlier article not focusing on hate speech, is that “if an individual
is excluded from participating in public discourse because the government disagrees with
the speaker’s views or because it finds the ideas expressed too disturbing or offensive,
any decision taken as a result of that discussion would, as to such an excluded citizen,
lack legitimacy.” Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529–30 (quoting Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 111, at 498). Neither in my Opening Article nor
in the article it quotes did I state that hate speech restrictions are imposed “merely” for
these reasons. To the contrary, in the quoted article I write that hate speech
“undoubtedly causes” psychic injury to members of minority groups and noted the
possibility that such expression might lead others to discriminate against minorities. See
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 500. What I did claim in my Opening Article is that
indefensible reasons offered in support of hate speech bans, such as Brown’s invocation
of the precautionary principle, raise the suspicion that the real motivation for suppressing
such speech is the “morally repugnant” viewpoint it expresses. Weinstein, supra note 1,
at 580. See also id. at 579 n.183.
116. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 40, at 1107; WEINSTEIN, supra note 103, at
127-35.
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vulnerable minorities unsure of their status in society.117 And as I
also acknowledged in that article, hate speech might even
damage the political legitimacy that I argue is undermined by
hate speech laws, a concern I will address in detail later in this
Reply.118
With these possible misconceptions cleared up, I will now
turn to the two main criticisms of my claim that hate speech bans
impair the legitimacy of downstream legislation, particularly
antidiscrimination measures.
B. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HATE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
Several symposiasts claim that I exaggerate the detrimental
effect that hate speech bans can have on the legitimacy of
downstream legislation. Some of the criticism focuses on the
nature of hate speech bans and deny my contention that such
bans are viewpoint discriminatory. Other critiques center on the
extent of the restriction imposed by hate speech laws and
contend that it is far less than I claim. I will deal with each of
these points in turn.
1. The Nature of the Curtailment
Central to my view about the relationship between free
speech and political legitimacy is that viewpoint-discriminatory
speech regulations, that is, laws that forbid people from
expressing certain viewpoints in public discourse,119 can have
grave consequences for the legitimacy of downstream legislation.
In my Opening Article, I cited hate speech bans as an exemplar
of viewpoint-discriminatory regulation and explored the
detrimental effect these upstream speech restrictions could have
on downstream legislation, particularly antidiscrimination laws.
117. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 548, 583.
118. Id. at 581–582.
119. Waldron is correct that proponents of the legitimacy argument, including me,
have sometimes been “loose” in describing the nature and extent of curtailment on the
ability of people to participate in public discourse imposed by speech restrictions.
Waldron, supra note 2, at 700. He notes, for instance, that in my Opening Article I quote
an earlier work in which I referred to people being “excluded” from participating in
public discourse. Id. But far from repeating this language to be as “loose” as I think I can
“get away with on this matter,” id., I quoted this earlier, broad formulation at the
beginning of that article to “credit[]” Waldron for “properly criticizing Dworkin and me
for not adequately specifying” our claim. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 531. So Waldron
should learn to take “yes” (and a compliment) for an answer.
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In his Response, Waldron takes issue with my
characterization of hate speech laws as viewpoint discriminatory.
Indeed, qualifying his previous position that hate speech laws are
“undoubtedly content-based,”120 he now argues that they are
only “sort of content-based.”121 He contends that most hate
speech laws forbid only expression that is intended to have the
effect of stirring up hatred against a certain group of people. He
then notes that because of this intent requirement the “self-same
proposition” that would violate a hate speech law would not
come within its prohibition if uttered without the requisite intent
or under circumstances in which the speaker could not
reasonably foresee a prohibited effect. For this reason, Waldron
concludes, hate speech laws “get at content only by virtue of its
intended effect on the community, rather than on the sole basis
of the propositions expressed” and therefore are only “sort of
content-based.” 122
Waldron’s complicated argument is easily refuted. It is the
speech that a law prohibits, not that which it leaves unregulated,
that is relevant to determining whether a law is content-based or
content-neutral. To use one of Waldron’s own examples, a law
that prohibits someone from shouting “Fuck!” in public123 is no
less content based because it does not prohibit people from
yelling this “self-same” profanity in private.124 Waldron, is, of
course free to modify his previous conclusion that hate speech
bans are undoubtedly content based. He cannot, however, avoid
the persuasiveness of his previous analysis or escape his apt
120. Waldron, supra note 2, at 701 (citing WALDRON, HATE SPEECH supra note 4, at
150-55). Viewpoint-based speech restrictions are a subset of content-based laws. See
Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint
discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content discrimination.”). Thus, in addition to
including viewpoint-discriminatory laws, the category of content-based speech restriction
comprises laws that curtail expression based on its subject matter, its use of particular
words or symbols or, more generally, because of the communicative impact of the
speech.
121. Waldron, supra note 2, at 701.
122. Id.
123. WALDRON, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 182. Though I do not think it is
viewpoint based. See supra note 120 and infra text accompanying notes 126 to 130.
124. While a requirement that the speech must intend to create a certain effect
cannot eliminate the content-based nature of a speech restriction, it is relevant to the
extent of the curtailment it imposes on a speaker’s ability to express a particular idea in
public discourse. This is the issue explored in Part II C, below. In this regard, however, it
should be noted that it is not at all clear that the British hate speech law, let alone most
hate speech provisions, imposes a requirement that the speech intend to have the effect
of stirring up hatred against a certain group of people. See Post, supra note 3, at 653.
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observation that arguments such as the one he now deploys are
“casuistry.”125
Waldron is on somewhat firmer ground in arguing that the
requirement that hateful ideas “be expressed in a certain
manner,” such as by the use of “threatening, abusive or
insulting” language as required by section 18(1) of the UK’s
Public Order Act, does not prohibit “certain views per se.”126 In
theory at least a ban on highly vituperative expression might still
125. WALDRON, HATE SPEECH, supra note 4, at 151. Waldron’s argument that hate
speech laws are not content based is similar to the view, noted but “put aside” by Stone,
that hate speech laws are not viewpoint based because “they are not targeted at
viewpoints per se but at the harmful consequences of hateful speech.” Stone, supra note
3, at 689 n.7. Shiffrin may be making something akin to this argument in noting that
although the United States Supreme Court would find hate speech bans to be
“impermissible point-of-view discrimination,” the better approach “would be to
recognize that racist speech causes unjustifiable harm and promoting racial tolerance
does not.” (Perhaps though Shiffrin is not denying that hate speech laws are viewpoint
discriminatory but only that they are not impermissibly so.) For all practical purposes,
this position renders the category of viewpoint discriminatory laws the null set. I take it
that every participant in this Symposium agrees that it is not acceptable in a liberal
democracy for government to suppress speech in public discourse because it “disagrees
with a speaker’s views or because it finds the ideas expressed too disturbing or
offensive.” See supra note 115 and accompanying text. Accordingly, all restrictions on
public discourse need to be justified in terms of “the harmful consequences” of the
speech. But if the harm in question is claimed to result from the expression of a particular
point of view—be it that democratic governments should be violently overthrown and
replaced with the dictatorship of the proletariat; that those drafted to fight an unjust war
should refuse to serve; or that certain racial, ethnic and religious groups are inferior—
then no matter how real and substantial the harm in question, a law suppressing that
point of view nonetheless is still based on that viewpoint.
126. Waldron, supra note 2, at 701–02. Post and Heinze in their Commentaries
vigorously object to the distinction between the manner and content of expression on
which Waldron relies. Invoking Percy Bysshe Shelley’s argument about the impossibility
of translating poetry, Post argues there are “ideas which can be expressed only in the
particular outrageous style that hate-speech regulations proscribe,” Post, supra note 3, at
656. Heinze similarly derides what he calls the “form-content” distinction, arguing at
length that the suppression of particular words, including racial epithets, inevitably
suppresses ideas. Heinze, supra note 3, at 649–50. I agree that the regulation of the
manner of expression, including bans on vituperation, can sometimes substantially
impede speakers from expressing the precise idea they want to convey. For example,
there is no other way to express the precise idea conveyed by the message “Fuck the
Draft” emblazoned on an anti-war protestor’s jacket. Still, I do not agree that the
regulation of the manner of expression has an inevitable suppressive effect on a speaker’s
ability to convey ideas as Post and Heinze contend. In his Commentary, Blasi attacks the
form-content distinction from another direction, persuasively arguing that temperate
hate speech poses a greater danger to the civic standing of vulnerable minority groups
than does vituperative expression. Blasi, supra note 3, at 589. Accord, WEINSTEIN, supra
note 103, at 130 (conjecturing that “subtly racist public expression” is more likely to
instill racist beliefs in others than are pronouncements by “gruesome characters as neoNazis, skinheads and Klansmen.”
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allow a speaker to convey “something like . . . the propositional
content” of the view he wants to express.127 So upon further
reflection,128 I agree with Waldron that in the functional sense I
am primarily using the term viewpoint discrimination in this
discussion, that is, preventing a speaker from expressing a
particular view in public discourse, hate speech laws that do not
significantly impair a speaker’s ability to express bigoted views
in public discourse are not viewpoint discriminatory.129 For if a
speaker can still express the basic propositional content of the
idea he wants to convey, the regulation would have at most only
minimal implications for the basic democratic precept of formal
equality and hence for normative legitimacy.130 But as I
127. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 135.
128. I acknowledged in my Opening Article that despite their discriminatory effect,
hate speech laws banning only highly vituperative expression might arguably be
considered viewpoint neutral. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545 n.79. However, I rejected
that characterization because such laws would likely have a discriminatory effect in that
such bans would, for instance, prevent a bigot agitating against an antidiscrimination
measure from referring to members of minority groups as “cockroaches” but would not
prevent supporters of the antidiscrimination measure from using such epithets to refer to
bigots. Id. at 545. Nonetheless, I concluded that because a legislature could reasonably
assume that referring to members of vulnerable racial and ethnic groups as animals we
normally seek to exterminate could make racial and ethnic minority groups unsure of
their status in society, the discriminatory effect might under some circumstances be
justified. Id. at 548. I therefore find it bewildering that Gelber could write that my
“steeping in the requirement under First Amendment jurisprudence to avoid viewpoint
discrimination at all costs blinds [me] to the differential harms of these two events.”
Gelber, supra note 3, at 626.
129. In contrast, even if limited to bigoted views expressed with extreme
vituperation, under American free speech doctrine such a ban would most likely be
considered viewpoint based. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).
In his Commentary, Shiffrin points to speech regulations in the United States that he
claims to be viewpoint discriminatory but which do not offend the First Amendment.
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 676. With the exception of certain justifications that have been
offered to justify obscenity laws, which I agree are arguably viewpoint discriminatory in
the relevant sense (see generally James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First
Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 865, 893-96 (2007)), the other two
examples he gives are not analogous to the suppression of hateful ideas about racial,
ethnic or religious groups. Shiffrin notes that under the defamation law “nasty”
comments about a person are sometimes actionable, while “nice” statements are
protected by the First Amendment, and that similarly, under some circumstances
advocacy of illegal action is unprotected speech, while advocacy of legal action is
protected. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 677. While these distinctions may in some sense be
based on a speaker’s viewpoint, they do not single out a particular ideological position
for suppression as do hate speech laws. As such, they do not have the same implications
for political legitimacy as do hate speech bans.
130. The one important exception is if the selective imposition of the manner
restriction is not well justified. Suppose, for instance, that anti-war protestors were not
allowed to shout profanities such as “Fuck the War” in public, while those who
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demonstrated in my Opening Article and discuss below,
Waldron’s assertion that “most” hate speech laws ban only
highly vituperative expression of bigoted views can be seriously
doubted.131 Rather, in many cases hate speech laws have been
used to suppress fairly temperate expression. 132
Finally, Waldron challenges the emphasis I place on
whether speech restriction is viewpoint discriminatory or instead
more broadly bans expression in a viewpoint-neutral manner.
He points out that under both regulations “[s]omeone is still
being prevented from saying what he wants to say as he says it.
To that effect there is still an impact on the quality of public
debate: it is not as it would be if there were no restrictions.” He
therefore asks, “[W]hy should the nature of the restriction—
viewpoint-based or non-viewpoint-based—make all the
difference here?”133

supported a country’s war effort could yell “Fuck the Enemy.” In that event, there would
be a significant effect on normative legitimacy even though the anti-war protestors could
still convey the basic propositional content of their message. For this reason a poorly
justified selective regulation of the manner of expression would be viewpoint
discriminatory as I use that term in this discussion. However, since I believe that a
selective ban on highly vituperative hate speech, such as referring to members of certain
vulnerable ethnic and racial groups as “animals we normally seek to exterminate,”
Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335, might in certain circumstances be
well justified, there would in that case be no significant detriment to normative
legitimacy worked by the selectivity. Still, as I emphasize in my Opening Article, even if
such well-justified restrictions do not significantly damage normative legitimacy, they still
might have a significant detrimental effect on descriptive legitimacy. See Weinstein,
supra note 1, at 564–65.
131. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 542-49; see also infra text accompanying notes
135 to 142.
132. Waldron seems to have upon reflection also slightly modified his position about
restrictions on the manner of expression and normative legitimacy. He acknowledges
that “[I]f a citizen thinks of himself as the sort of person who shouts ‘fuck’ or utters
threats in political debate or shows dirty pictures during his political orations then—I
don’t know—maybe a case can be made that he is not being respected as such.” Waldron,
supra note 2, at 713. (He adds that he is “being respected as someone who could be
better than that, and as someone who has responsibilities as well as rights in the political
process,” but realizes that this is “another matter.” Id.) So if someone wanting to express
a particular viewpoint, say an anti-war or anti-abortion protestor or someone wanting to
express racist views, is selectively forbidden from using profanity in a public debate, one
might infer that Waldron now agrees with me that a hate ban limited to vituperation has
somewhat greater impact on normative legitimacy than he previously thought. Shiffrin, in
contrast, does not even make even this minimal concession, claiming that hate speech
restrictions do not disrespect the speaker or his equal moral worth but at most only show
“disrespect for a particular speech choice the citizen would like to make.” Shiffrin, supra
note 3, at 687.
133. Waldron, supra note 2, at 713.
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The answer to this query is the same as I gave in
distinguishing his scenario in which someone was
disenfranchised by onerous ID-requirements or stringent
restrictions on early voting: viewpoint-discriminatory speech
restrictions implicate the core precept of equal citizenship in a
way that non-discriminatory curtailment of political participation
does not. Compare, for instance, a law that forbids anyone from
protesting on the sidewalk in front of the United States Supreme
Court with one allowing protests except for those against the
Court’s decisions legalizing abortion. Under both laws antiabortion demonstrators are “being prevented from saying what
[they] want to say . . .” But it cannot be seriously gainsaid that
the viewpoint-based law infringes core democratic equality
concerns far more than the more extensive yet viewpoint-neutral
law.134
2. The Extent of Speech Curtailment
In my Opening Article I discussed a number of cases in
which people were arrested, prosecuted or convicted under hate
speech laws for relatively temperate expression of racist or antiIslamic speech or for criticizing homosexuality as immoral or
disordered.135 Among the cases I discussed were the conviction
of a Dutch politician for calling for the removal of “all
Surinamers, Turks and other so-called guest-workers from the

134. Stone finds it “especially eye-catching” that I invoke the concept of viewpoint
discrimination as a core principle of freedom of speech “given that in its aversion to
viewpoint discrimination (like much else) First Amendment law is highly unusual.”
Stone, supra note 3, at 687. But this aversion to viewpoint discrimination is not just some
quaint and peculiar detail of American free speech doctrine. It is, rather, a core doctrinal
rule implemented to vindicate the basic democratic commitment to formal equality and
the equal moral worth of each citizen and to promote political legitimacy. See Weinstein,
supra note 1, at 536–37. While the details of free speech doctrine will inevitably and
properly differ in different democratic societies, there are nonetheless core precepts that
apply in any democracy, including the right to formal equal participation in the
democratic process. I am not claiming that any democracy that fails to share American
free speech doctrine’s broad, fierce version of viewpoint discrimination is betraying this
core democratic precept. Thus Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 679 n.17, over-reads my position
when he claims that I believe that Britain’s hate speech ban necessarily involves
“impermissible” viewpoint discrimination. Cultural differences properly have some
bearing in determining whether a regulation breaches a core democratic precept in a
particular society. Nonetheless, I do believe that viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on
public discourse as I use the term in this article (see supra text accompanying note 129) at
least directly implicate this core democratic precept even if they do not violate it.
135. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–58.
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Netherlands”;136 the fining of a an Austrian academic for saying
that Mohammad “had a thing for little girls”;137 the fining of
actress Brigitte Bardot for writing that Muslims were destroying
France by “imposing their ways”;138 and the unsuccessful
prosecution of the Catholic Bishop of Belgium for expressing the
view that homosexuality was a “blockage in normal
psychological development.”139 I claimed that these and other
cases show that contrary to Waldron’s assertion, hate speech
bans “manifestly do not in practice provide a ‘safe haven’ for
expressing ‘something like the propositional content’ of bigoted
views that become illegal only ‘when expressed as
vituperation.’”140 I acknowledged that such applications to
temperate speech do not “represent the typical hate speech
case,” which often does involve vituperation.141 I emphasized,
however, that in evaluating these applications to nonvituperative speech, we need to consider not just the effect on
the speakers in these cases but also the “chilling effect” these
cases would likely have on would-be speakers.142
In her short yet incisive Commentary, Gelber insists that the
thirty-two cases that I discuss143 are insufficient in “empirical
terms”144 to disprove Waldron’s contention that most hate
speech laws provide a “safe haven” for the temperate expression
of the basic “propositional content” of the view the speaker
wants to express. She insists that a “far more in-depth and
systemic study would be needed regarding the operation of hate
speech law in practice to sustain this point.”145 Gelber’s criticism
is well taken. What I should have said is that these cases cast
considerable doubt on the validity of Waldron’s assertion that
“most [hate] speech laws bend over backward to ensure that
there is a lawful way of expressing something like the
propositional content of views that become objectionable when

136. Id. at 553.
137. Id. at 557–58.
138. Id. at 558.
139. Id. at 559.
140. Id. at 561 (quoting Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 335).
141. Id. at 560.
142. Id. at 559, 562.
143. Gelber counts fifteen cases from twelve jurisdictions that I discuss in text, plus
another seventeen cases discussed in footnotes. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627.
144. Id. at 628.
145. Id.
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expressed as vituperation.”146 Or even if Waldron is right that
the intent of most such laws is to create such “safe havens” for
non-vituperative expression of bigoted views,147 the cases I
discuss raise serious concerns whether in practice most hate
speech laws have actually created such safe zones.148
I am not sure if Gelber would concur with even these
modified claims.149 It is interesting to note though that she does
agree that some of the cases I mention “ought not to have been
considered hate speech and ought not to have been
prosecuted.”150 Waldron, in contrast, is remarkably unconcerned
by the cases I discuss in which no such “safe harbor” was
provided for non-vituperative expression of bigoted views. The
entirety of his response to my examples of fairly temperate
speech having been prosecuted is this: “No doubt there are hate
speech laws in the world expressed less carefully, with less
attention to these fastidious distinctions than the British
provisions I have cited.151 But our debate is about hate speech
restrictions as such, not about the least well-formulated of
them.”152 Professor Blasi is surely correct, therefore, when he
146. Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note, 4 at 335.
147. Which I take it is what he means by “bend over backward.”
148. And, of course, if the thirty-two cases I cite are empirically insufficient to show
that most hate speech laws fail to create such “safe havens,” then Waldron’s assertion
that most such laws allow ample opportunity for speakers to express bigoted views
without vituperation, a claim he supports by reference to two statutes, is far more
empirically deficient. While this should go without saying, I mention it only because
Gelber, while properly critical of the empirical limitations of my challenge to Waldron’s
claim, gives Waldron a pass on the far greater empirical shortcomings of his claim.
149. She does suggest though that I would be correct to say that the number of these
cases is large enough to be “worrying.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 628.
150. Gelber notes “in particular the cases in which Christians put forward their views
about homosexuality.” Id. at 629. Gelber gives no reason for finding these cases
particularly problematic as compared to the other ones I discuss. It would be interesting
to know why Gelber does not regard as equally problematic, for instance, the fining of an
Austrian academic for saying in a seminar that Mohammed had “a thing for little girls.”
See supra, text accompanying note 137. It would also be worth knowing whether the call
by the Dutch politician to remove “all Surinamers, Turks and other so-called guestworkers from the Netherlands,” see supra text accompanying note 136, is in her view hate
speech that may properly be prohibited in a free and democratic society.
151. Waldron, supra note 2, at 703. I tend to agree with Waldron about the British
hate speech laws. He did not, however, limit his claim to these laws but rather referred to
“most” hate speech laws.
152. Id. Waldron adds that “opponents of hate speech regulation ought to consider
the best case that can be made for regulation of this sort.” Id. at 703–04. I agree with this
sentiment and tried to do just that in my one comprehensive discussion of the pros and
cons of hate speech laws. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 103. But just as opponents of hate
speech legislation should consider the “best case” for such laws, proponents of such laws
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observes that “Waldron fails to grapple as fully as he needs to
with the challenges to his argument” that these cases pose.153
Gelber also is correct in claiming that there is “insufficient
evidence” to support my claim that the cases I discuss
“undoubtedly” have had a “chilling effect” on non-vituperative
speech.154 Although United States Supreme Court decisions
frequently rely on such an effect,155 there is surprisingly very
little empirical support for the existence of this phenomenon.156
Significantly, however, even if the uncertain reach of many hate
speech laws does not deter people from expressing views that the
laws did not in fact mean to ban, it would still be the case that in
should consider the “worst cases” of the application and misapplication of hate speech
legislation.
153. Blasi, supra note 3, at 585. While Waldron is remarkably nonchalant about
these cases, Brown pretends the most troubling among them simply don’t exist. Brown
begins this exercise in denial by inaccurately claiming that the “vast majority” of the
cases I discuss involve not the group defamation laws (sensu stricto) and incitement to
hatred laws that he defends but rather “expression-oriented hate crimes,” specifically,
public order offences, which he does not. Brown, supra note 3, at 606. In fact, I discuss
ten public order act cases, hardly a “vast majority” of the thirty-two cases I mention. Of
the remaining twenty-two cases, fifteen involved incitement to hatred laws and seven
involved group defamation laws (albeit some not sensu stricto). Brown acknowledges
only one of these twenty-two cases, Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek v. Netherlands. He
ignores the other twenty-one cases, including the cases against a Catholic Bishop, an
Austrian academic, and Brigitte Bardot discussed supra, text accompanying notes 137 to
139.
154. Gelber, supra note 3, at 628 (quoting Weinstein, supra note 1, at 559).
155. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
156. See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1633, 1681 (2013) (“[T]he existence of a chilling effect . . . is very difficult to
establish, even with the aid of a variety of sophisticated empirical tools.”). Gelber claims
that her own research shows “no evidence of chilling effect” from “25 years of the
operation of hate speech laws in Australia.” Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, The
Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws: Lessons from Australia, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631,
631, 656 (2015). Gelber states that her “analysis of letters to the editor revealed little
evidence that public discourse has been diminished over the past 25 years” because
“[r]obust debates have been had on a broad range of issues” and that her “analysis
revealed the continued expression of prejudice over time.” Id. at 656. She noted that she
“detected a shift away from more intemperate styles of language,” but concluded that the
shift “cannot be said to support the chilling effect claim.” Id. While it may be true that
Gelber’s study shows “no evidence of chilling effect,” it also provides next to “no
evidence” that the chilling effect does not exist. That in the aggregate the robustness of
discourse in letters to the editor may not have been diminished since the enactment of
Australia’s hate speech laws tells us very little about whether particular individuals were
deterred by these laws from expressing views not within the intended scope of the
prohibition of these laws in these letters or in other settings for public discourse. So to
paraphrase Kendrick, Gelber’s study shows that it is “very difficult . . . even with the aid
of a variety of sophisticated tools” to establish the non-existence of the chilling effect.
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many jurisdictions someone wanting to call for the removal of
“so-called guest workers” of certain ethnicities from their
country; or to condemn Mohammad as a pedophile; or argue
that Muslims were destroying the country by “imposing their
ways”; or to claim that homosexuality was a “blockage in normal
psychological development”;157 would have reasonable grounds
to fear arrest for doing so. For here it is not just the uncertain
reach of the laws that may (or may not) “chill” such speech.
Rather, the deterrence arises from the fact that others have been
arrested, and in many cases convicted, for conveying precisely
the views the speaker wants to express.
There is also merit to Gelber’s objection, echoing Waldron’s
complaint,158 about my use of cases decided under Section 5 of
the UK’s Public Order Act to show that there was no “safe
haven” for relatively temperate expression of expression
condemning homosexuality or Islam. Gelber writes that if I
wanted to show “the misapplication of hate speech laws” that it
would have been helpful if I had limited my inquiry to these
laws.159 I invoked the Section 5 cases, however, not to bolster my
claim about misapplication of hate speech laws per se but rather
to show that even where, as in the UK, the hate speech laws
might intend to create a safe haven for relatively temperate
expression, other laws might still prohibit such expression.160 But
this point would have been clearer if I had considered the
Section 5 cases separately and not interspersed them with
misapplication of hate speech laws.
Still, Waldron is wrong when he says that these Section 5
cases have “nothing to do with our disagreement about hate
speech.”161 To the contrary, as Gelber correctly notes, Section 5
has been “used to shut down what was perceived to be hate
speech.”162 For instance, in determining that a street preacher’s
placard referring to homosexuality as immoral violated Section
5, the Court of Appeal emphasized that “there is a need to show
157. See supra text accompanying notes 136 to 139.
158. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 702–03.
159. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627.
160. Cf. Waldron, supra note 2, at 702 (“Weinstein cites the invocation of section 5
of the Public Order Act in a number of British cases . . . to illustrate his contention that
hate speech laws make it quite difficult to safely express the ‘basic propositional content’
of bigoted views even when expressed without vituperation or use of vicious epithets.”).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627.
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tolerance towards all sections of society” and that therefore the
message on the preacher’s placard “went beyond legitimate
protest.”163 The Norwood case even more directly involves
expression punished because it was “perceived to be hate
speech.” In that case, the penalty for non-vituperative speech
insulting to Islam (which the Court of Appeal also condemned as
going “beyond legitimate protest”) was enhanced because the
expression was “motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility
towards members of a racial or religious group based on their
membership in that group.”164
It is true that the Section 5 cases I discussed do not directly
impugn the operation of hate speech laws in Britain or
elsewhere. These cases do, however, put into doubt any claim
that there is a “safe haven” even in Britain for non-vituperative
speech critical of homosexuality or insulting to Islam.165
Moreover, even though the decisions upholding convictions for
this expression may not have expressly used the term “hate
speech,” this is precisely the type of expression prohibited by
hate speech laws in other democracies.166 In the United States,
163. See Hammond v. Dep’t of Pub. Pros’ns, [2004] EWHC 69, ¶ 5 (Admin),
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2004/69.html. It is true, as Waldron says,
that analogous to bans on “fighting words,” Section 5 is concerned with public order and
not as are hate speech laws, with the “proliferation of racial hatred in a community.”
Waldron, supra note 2, at 702. As this and other cases reveal, however, he is wide of the
mark in suggesting that as applied Section 5 is not concerned with the proliferation of
hatred, or at least intolerance, towards homosexuals and religious groups.
164. Norwood v. Dir of Pub. Pros’ns, [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin),
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/1564.html. Waldron is correct that
this provision is a hate crime law, Waldron, supra note 2, at 703, and for that reason I was
careful not to refer to it as a hate speech provision. But in this case, it was applied to
speech made criminal by Section 5 and it thus operates with respect to the enhancement
as a regulation of hate speech. Waldron mentions that he is “not sure” of my views on
hate crime legislation. As I have written, laws that enhance the punishment for biasmotivated crimes do not on their face offend free speech principles but can do so in their
application. See James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A Comment on
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. 345 (1994); James Weinstein, First Amendment
Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation: Where’s the Speech?, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 6
(1992). I should add by way of disclosure that I was an advisor to the State of Wisconsin
in its successful defense of hate crime laws in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993).
165. I recognize that Waldron did not claim that any such safe haven actually
existed, but only that, what he believes is typical of hate speech laws in other
jurisdictions. Britain’s hate speech bans did not extend to non-vituperative expression. I
do, however, think it relevant that even if Britain’s hate speech law does not seek to
prohibit non-vituperative bigoted expression, other laws do so precisely because the
expression is “perceived to be hate speech.” See Gelber, supra note 3, at 627.
166. Compare, e.g., Hammond with the prosecution of the Catholic Bishop for
calling homosexuality disordered (discussed supra text accompanying note 139) and
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provisions against disorderly conduct are routinely used to
punish speech, including “fighting words” and true threats. But
precisely because in the United States hate speech is not a
category of expression that can be constitutionally suppressed,
public order acts in the United States cannot be used to punish
hate speech as such but only if it otherwise constitutes
unprotected speech.167
To conclude this discussion of the extent of the actual
curtailment on expression imposed by hate speech requirements,
I want to return to the Evangelical Photographer Scenario. In
my Opening Article I contended that in many jurisdictions with
hate speech laws on the books someone might reasonably fear
being arrested, and perhaps even convicted, for expressing the
view in the public square that homosexuality was immoral. So
while my “anecdotal claims”168 about how hate speech laws
actually operate might not have with adequate social scientific
rigor disproved Waldron’s far less empirically-supported
assertion about “safe havens” for temperate expression; and
while there may be little empirical evidence that hate speech
laws “chill” speech not intended to be proscribed; it is telling
that no participant in this Symposium denied my claim that it
would be reasonable for a citizen in many democratic
jurisdictions with hate speech bans to forego even such relatively
temperate criticism of homosexuality for fear of arrest. Even in
the absence of definite proof, the distinct possibility that
relatively temperate speech in the public square opposing the
addition of sexual orientation to a nation’s antidiscrimination
Norwood with J. Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek v. Netherlands, App. Nos. 8348/78 and
8406/78, [1980] 23 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 366 (Eur. Comm’n. on H.R.),
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1979/8.html (discussed supra text accompanying
note 136).
167. Indeed, in accord with American free speech doctrine’s intense hostility to
viewpoint discrimination, a law that selectively punishes hate speech constituting a public
order violation is unconstitutional. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(striking down municipal ordinance for selectively targeting fighting words that arouse
“anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender”). It is sometimes mistakenly (and carelessly) asserted that R.A.V. held that
expressive activity at issue in that case—a white juvenile’s placing a burning cross on a
black family’s lawn—was constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER,
EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 55 (2013). Not only did the
Court not so hold, but it suggested that this “reprehensible” act (R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396)
could have been punished consistent with the First Amendment, under any number of
criminal provisions, including a prohibition of terroristic threats. Id. at 380 n.1.
168. Gelber, supra note 3, at 627.
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laws, or criticizing Islam as part of opposition to a country’s
immigration policy, should raise real concern about the potential
of hate speech laws to undermine the legitimacy of downstream
antidiscrimination laws.
In response, several commentators argue that legitimacy
concerns appear on both sides of the equation in that hate
speech itself can impair political legitimacy by curtailing the
ability of the subjects of such speech to participate as equals in
the political process. I agree that any theory grounding free
speech in political legitimacy must carefully consider any
countervailing legitimacy interests for speech restrictions. For
this reason, I raised and discussed this issue in my Opening
Article and will now respond at length to the various arguments
made by Commentators that hate speech itself can impair
legitimacy.
C. COUNTERVAILING LEGITIMACY CONCERNS AND THE
“SILENCING” ARGUMENT
Proponents of hate speech laws often claim that hate speech
silences its victims. For anyone concerned about political
legitimacy, this claim must be taken seriously.169 People being
prevented from participating in public discourse for any reason,
including by the speech of others, will interfere with the ability
of those who have been silenced “identify[ing] with the state in
the manner required by democratic legitimacy.”170 In addition, as
I explained in my Opening Article, such silencing might render
immoral the enforcement of particular laws against those whose
speech has been curtailed.171 The silencing argument, however,
suffers from a crucial defect: although the claim has been made
169. For this reason, I took issue in my Opening Article to Heinze’s claim such bans
can “never promote the state’s democracy.” Weinstein, supra note 1, at 581 n.190.
Although not directly responding to this criticism in his Commentary, Heinze continues
to insist that viewpoint-based restrictions in public discourse are democratically
illegitimate in principle. He thus analogizes such restrictions to a single falsified ballot
case in an election which although its impact will almost always be nil, is still contrary to
democracy. Heinze, supra note 3, at 645. The analogy is inapt. Unlike a falsified ballot,
which can never promote democracy, not even theoretically, hate speech bans can
promote democracy if necessary to prevent bigoted expression from, for instance,
preventing people from participating in public discourse because they reasonably fear
they will be physically harmed if they do so.
170. ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
203 (2015).
171. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 581–82.
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for decades, there is to date at most only meagre evidence that
hate speech as part of public discourse172—and it is only bans on
hate speech as part of public discourse that I argue impair
political legitimacy—prevents anyone from “contribut[ing] to
public discourse [and] participat[ing] in the formation of public
opinion.”173 It is important, therefore, to see various silencing
172. It is true that the line dividing public discourse from other forms of speech may
be blurry. Still, certain types of speech are clearly not within the domain of public
discourse, including a “Whites Only” sign on a business establishment, see BROWN, supra
note 170, at 87; a foreman using the word “nigger” to refer to African-American workers,
id. at 85; burning a cross on a black family’s lawn, BUTLER, supra note 167, at 55; or
scrawling anti-Muslim graffiti or placing a racist poster on a mosque, Waldron, HATE
SPEECH, supra note 4, at 1–2. Even under American free speech doctrine, none of this
speech is protected, and properly so. Accordingly, the harms caused by such expression
are irrelevant to whether hate speech that is part of public discourse can appropriately be
prohibited under a “silencing” or any other rationale. In contrast, someone standing in a
public square with a sign reading “Stop Homosexuality, Stop Lesbianism, Stop
Immorality, Jesus is Lord,” see Weinstein, supra note 1, at 555, plainly is engaging in
public discourse; as was Brigitte Bardot’s statement on her webpage about Muslims or
the Catholic Bishop’s comments to a journalist about homosexuals. See supra, text
accompanying notes 138 to 139.
173. Brown, supra note 3, at 612. Nearly 20 years ago, I observed that “the
proponents of the silencing argument offer no supporting evidence.” WEINSTEIN, supra
note 103, at 133. Two years later I wrote that although one could imagine a society in
which “a group is so subordinated and racist speech so prevalent that vicious epithets in
public discourse will likely impede their participation in democratic self-governance,”
there was no evidence that I was aware of that hate speech had this effect in the United
States. See James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Viewpoint Neutrality, and the American
Concept of Democracy, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ORDER
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (T. Hensley ed., 2001). In her Commentary, Gelber
concedes that “there is not a great deal” of evidence supporting the silencing argument
but notes that “there are findings from psychology that show that individuals subjected to
non-physical discrimination suffer significant harms to their physical and mental health.”
Gelber, supra note 3, at 623. None of these studies, however, focuses on speech as part of
public discourse and therefore provide no support for the claim that such expression
causes these harms. In addition, it does not follow that the injuries described in these
studies will prevent those subject to “non-physical discrimination” from participating in
public discourse. In addition, Gelber writes that her own empirical research “has shown
that target communities claim to experience the harms of hate speech alleged in the
literature,” citing without further discussion Katharine Gelber & Luke J. McNamara,
Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22 SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016). But like the other
studies she cites, this one also does not distinguish between the harms, including
silencing, resulting from hate speech as part of public discourse and non-public discourse
such as face-to-face encounters. The only empirical support that Brown offers for the
silencing effect other than the Gelber and McNamara study just discussed, is Laura
Leets, Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and
Antigay Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 341 (2002). See Brown, supra note 3, at 613 n.39. This
study too suffers from the problem of not specifying if the hate speech was part of public
discourse or personally directed speech. Of course, although not specified in the studies,
it may be that some of the speech involved in these studies was public discourse that in
turn deterred others from participating in public discourse. So under a very charitable
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arguments proffered in this Symposium for what they really are:
studious attempts to avoid the problem that there is a “paucity
of evidence” supporting this argument.174
1. Silencing, Legitimacy and Hypothetical Consent
Alexander Brown argues that the “assurance of civic
dignity” that Waldron emphasizes is “constitutive of the
realization of political legitimacy.”175 In Brown’s view “political
legitimacy, including the legitimacy of the legal system, itself
depends upon it being possible, at least in principle, to justify
that system to each citizen bound by it on the basis of
fundamentals of justice that they cannot reasonably reject.”176
Following this line of reasoning Brown asks:
[W]ould free and equal people have reasons based on the
fundamentals of justice to reject an aggressive free speech
regime that treated hate speech as a protected category even
though certain forms of hate speech carry a risk of effectively
removing from some people who are the subject of hate

view of what counts as empirical evidence, Gelber might be right that “[i]t is therefore
not true that there is no evidence that silencing operates in the ways that defenders of
hate speech laws allege.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 623 (emphasis added). Still, although
defenders of hate speech laws have made this silencing argument for decades, the
evidence that they have been able to produce in support of this theory is remarkably
paltry.
174. As I observed in my Opening Article, Brown had previously noted the
objection that the silencing argument was supported by a “paucity of evidence.”
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 579 (citing BROWN, supra note 170, at 198 (2015)). Tellingly,
however, Brown in this work did not express disagreement with this objection or cite to
any evidence supporting the silencing effect. Instead, he sought to avoid this objection by
invoking the precautionary principle. See BROWN, supra note 170, at 199. Similarly, as
Brown candidly acknowledges, see Brown, supra note 3, at 613 n.39, it was only after the
editor of this Symposium suggested that he try to support the silencing argument with
some evidence that Brown revised his Commentary by citing two articles which he
asserted without analysis supported the silencing effect. Id. As I discuss in note 173,
supra, if these studies supply any relevant evidence at all, it is at best meager evidence
supporting Brown’s claim that hate speech prevents anyone from participating in public
discourse. But equally as important, that Brown was on at least two occasions content to
invoke the precautionary principle in the face of the objection that there was “a paucity
of evidence” supporting the silencing principle without citing to any evidence of such a
silencing effect, shows just how truly empirically insensitive his argument is. In note 229,
below, I discuss Shiffrin’s interesting argument that the harms he claims hate speech
causes need not be supported by empirical studies.
175. Brown, supra note 3, at 604 (quoting BROWN, supra note 170, at 208).
176. Id. at 601 (quoting BROWN, supra note 170, at 208).
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speech real opportunities to contribute to public discourse
and participate in the formation of public opinion?177

Brown does not specifically answer this question. But his
answers to previous iterations of his “process of interpersonal
justification and consensus” leave little doubt that he thinks the
answer would be “yes.”178
I agree that it might be reasonable for “members of
minority or vulnerable groups”179 to reasonably reject as
contrary to “fundamentals of justice” an “aggressive free speech
regime” such as exists in the United States. But the
reasonableness of this conclusion would depend on such issues
as: 1) the types and extent of hate speech currently prevalent in
the society in question; 2) the extent to which these various
forms of hate speech “carry a risk” of preventing the subjects of
hate speech from participating in public discourse; 3) whether
the reaction to the hate speech was reasonable; 4) causes other
than hate speech for this “silencing” effect; 5) the likelihood that
hate speech bans will remedy this harm; 6) the availability and
likely effectiveness of viewpoint-neutral speech restriction, such
as general bans on threats, fighting words and incitement to
violence; 7) the availability and likely effectiveness of noncoercive alternative remedies; 8) the extent to which the
proposed hate speech laws are likely to be misapplied and thus
might silence people, including members of “minorities or
vulnerable groups” from participating in public discourse; and 9)
the benefits that all members of society,180 including “minorities
and vulnerable groups derive” from a “free speech regime” that
“aggressively” protects against viewpoint discrimination.
The answers to these questions will, of course, vary from
society to society as well as over time within each society. But
without careful consideration of these and other largely
empirical questions, it is impossible to make any meaningful
judgment about whether it is reasonable to reject the failure to
177. Id. at 617.
178. Brown, supra note 3, at 604. See also infra notes 182 and 184.
179. Id. at 601 (quoting BROWN, supra note 170, at 208).
180. I assume that those engaging in this “process of interpersonal justification and
consensus” are concerned not exclusively with their own interests but also to some extent
at least with the fair treatment of other groups in society as well as with the good of
society as a whole. One of the many problems with Brown’s use of this “process” is it
does not give us enough information about the parameters of this decision making
process.
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enact certain types of hate speech law as contrary to the
“fundamental justice” required for people being willing to join a
political community. For this reason, Brown’s “process of
interpersonal justification and consensus” is incapable of doing
anything
more
than
showing
that
“under
certain
circumstances”181 hate speech can have a detrimental impact on
political legitimacy, either through “silencing” or by inflicting
other harms,182 a proposition with which I readily agree.
Significantly, and consistent with this conclusion, Brown’s
“process of interpersonal justification and consensus” could be
employed to support an “aggressive” free speech regime that
would prevent the silencing of legitimate (and legitimating)
dissent. According to Brown, fundamentals of justice include
“everyone’s claim to have their welfare counted along with
everyone else’s welfare in the determination of social policy.”183
181. See Brown, supra note 3, at 601 (emphasis added). Occasionally Brown
acknowledges that such rejection will depend on circumstances; but more often this
qualification is lacking, suggesting that it can be determined from the arm chair.
182. The same objection applies to all other iterations of Brown’s use of “the process
of interpersonal justification and consensus” to try to prove the propriety of the types of
hate speech laws he supports. Besides invoking it in support of the silencing argument,
Brown uses this process in his Commentary to make a more direct attempt to prove these
types of hate speech laws are required by fundamentals of justice and thus promote
political legitimacy. Brown thus argues that “free and equal people might reasonably
look upon the adequate protection of their equal civic dignity, such as via group
defamation laws (sensu stricto) or incitement to hatred laws, as a precondition of any
notional agreement to joining the political community.” Brown, supra note 3, at 609. He
adds that “[p]erhaps there are other fundamentals of justice, such as safeguarding
people’s sense of their physical security, that is, freedom from legitimate fear of acts of
discrimination or violence, that are also preconditions for any notional agreement to
joining the political community, and that would also require laws, including incitement to
hatred laws, that combat hate speech that contributes to a climate of fear.” Id. at 609–10.
I agree that free speech doctrine so “aggressive” or “absolutist,” Brown, supra note 3, at
601, that it forbids speech restrictions needed to adequately protect civic dignity or
prevent legitimate fear of acts of discrimination or violence will diminish the legitimacy
of the legal system with respect to the subjects of hate speech. But as with the silencing
argument, whether it would be reasonable to reject the failure of a legal system to enact
the type of hate speech laws he supports as contrary to “fundamentals of justice”
depends on a number of crucial empirical inquiries. The same goes for Brown’s
argument, considered in my Opening Article, that it would be reasonable for members of
minority or vulnerable groups to reject as contrary to fundamentals of justice the
justification for not enacting hate speech laws that such laws may impair the legitimacy of
downstream laws from which these groups benefit. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 576–
78. As I have emphasized, pertinent to this inquiry is the application of hate speech laws
in actual operation to temperate criticism of homosexuality and Islam, a phenomenon
that Brown largely ignores. See supra, text accompanying notes 135 to 142.
183. Brown, supra note 3, at 601 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation:
The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1626 n.127 (2010)).
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It could therefore be argued that those who hold traditional
religious beliefs (among others who may want to vigorously
challenge current political orthodoxy) might reasonably reject as
contrary to fundamental justice any legal regime that permitted
viewpoint-based restrictions on public discourse, including hate
speech bans, on the grounds that even if narrowly drafted such
laws would in actual practice present “a risk of effectively
removing from some people . . . real opportunities to contribute
to public discourse and participate in the formation of public
opinion.”184 As with Brown’s use of the process of interpersonal
justification and consensus to argue against “aggressive” free
speech regimes, whether rejection of hate speech bans as
contrary to fundamentals of justice is reasonable would depend
on a host of empirical inquiries including the scope of the speech
restriction and whether it would prevent even temperate
criticism of homosexuality (or some other currently dominant
opinion in society). So, all that “the process of interpersonal
justification and consensus” is capable of doing is showing that
both hate speech bans and hate speech itself can potentially
184. In my Opening Article, I pointed out that there was an incommensurability
problem in weighing the loss of systemic legitimacy that Brown claimed resulted from
hate speech itself against the loss of legitimacy to particular laws that I claimed resulted
from hate speech laws. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 577. In his Commentary, Brown
insists that his account of political legitimacy does have the “wherewithal” to respond to
my claim about loss of legitimacy to downstream laws caused by hate speech bans.
Brown, supra note 3, at 603. Brown writes that he would tell those whose speech was
curtailed by hate speech laws that because the conduct prevented by downstream
antidiscrimination laws is “clearly unjust” they have an obligation to obey these measures
even if “to some extent the[ir] collective authorization” and “democratic legitimacy” has
been reduced by the upstream speech restriction. Id. at 603–04. He adds that these
people should keep in mind that these laws “curb forms of hate speech that can be
corrosive of a shared, public sense of the basic elements of people’s equal status and
dignity as members of society in good standing.” Id. at 604. Like all his uses of “the
process of interpersonal justification and consensus,” whether those whose speech has
been curtailed can reasonably reject this proposition depends on numerous empirical
inquires, including once again the extent of speech curtailment and thus the amount of
reduction of “collective authorization” and “democratic legitimacy” resulting from these
allegedly “narrowly framed” laws in actual operation. Id. at 603–04. Aside from failing to
address these crucial empirical questions, Brown’s attempt to justify these laws to
dissenters has the added defect of talking past my basic critique of hate speech bans and
political legitimacy. As I make clear, I share Brown’s view that the moral interest in
preventing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation in
“jobs, housing, transport, services, and so forth,” id. at 603, is so strong that it will be a
rare case in which a speech restriction can put in doubt the morality of enforcing such
laws. See Weinstein, supra note 1. The Evangelical Photographer scenario was meant to
represent such a rare yet realistic case. Rather than engage this challenge, Brown simply
ignores it.
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damage political legitimacy, a proposition that I expressly
acknowledged in my Opening Article.
Finally, even if in a particular mature, stable democratic
society it was reasonable for “minority and vulnerable groups”
to reject the failure to enact a particular type of hate speech laws
as contrary to “the fundamentals of justice,” difficult empirical
(as well as normative) questions would remain as to the extent of
the damage the failure to enact these types of hate speech laws
has inflicted on the legal system.185 And precisely because
legitimacy is potentially on both sides of the equation, this
reduction in legitimacy would then have to be balanced against
the damage to the legitimacy of the legal system that hate speech
bans would likely cause.186

185. See id. at 604–05. Thus Brown does not argue that the failure to enact hate
speech laws entitles “minority and vulnerable groups” “to rise up in revolution” (see
Waldron, Political Legitimacy, supra note 4, at 332) because their civic dignity and sense
of security is not adequately protected. Rather, consistent with my view (adapting Dahl)
about viewpoint-based speech restrictions diminishing the “reservoir” of a legal system’s
legitimacy, see supra note 43, Brown argues that the failure of hate speech laws makes
the legal system “less politically legitimate than it could be.” Brown, supra note 3, at 610.
186. In this regard, it should be noted that the scope of hate speech restrictions that
Brown argues for is considerably broader than the one that Waldron defends. Thus in
addition to incitement to hatred laws and group defamation laws (sensu stricto) Brown
supports “regulations limiting the use of negative stereotyping or stigmatization, and
perhaps even Holocaust denial legislation.” BROWN, supra note 170, at 214. See also id.
at 146, criticizing Waldron for “overlooking other kinds of laws that might also be said to
protect the high and equal sociological status of vulnerable groups.” Brown, however,
resists any tradeoff between the promotion of political legitimacy he argues results from
hate speech bans and the damage to such legitimacy that I argue that such bans might
cause. Rather, he asserts “that political legitimacy takes lexical priority over and,
therefore, cannot be traded off against, the collective authorisation or democratic
legitimacy of downstream laws.” Brown, supra note 3, at 600. I am not sure whether
Brown means to confine this claim of priority to bar such tradeoff to cases involving
damage to legitimacy of downstream laws or to extend this priority to bar any proposed
tradeoff between the loss of legitimacy he identifies through the “process of
interpersonal justification and consensus,” on the one hand, and the loss of systemic
legitimacy that I and others argue can result from speech restrictions, on the other. But
there is no need to pursue this question, for Brown merely asserts but does not argue for
this priority. Relabeling the detriment to political legitimacy arising from speech
restrictions that I stress in this Symposium as “collective authorisation or democratic
legitimacy” while reserving the term “political legitimacy” for his account of legitimacy is
surely not an argument for such priority. And I can think of no reason why the legitimacy
concerns that Brown derives from a theory based in hypothetical consent should
categorically take priority over legitimacy concerns that I and others derive from a
theory of political participation based on formal equality.
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2. Silencing and the Precautionary Principle
In my Opening Article I remarked that Brown’s invocation
of the precautionary principle187 to compensate for the lack of
evidence supporting the silencing argument turned “a
problematic though plausible argument into a plainly
indefensible one.”188 In his Commentary, Brown continues to try
to defend the indefensible. He begins by discussing arguments
for banning hate speech as a prophylactic measure against
genocide or “terrorist atrocities” that threaten national
security.189 He then refers to these “grave and irreversible”
harms as “equivalent to the devastating climate change harms
that are associated with the precautionary principle in the field
of environmental regulation.”190 But having invoked these
catastrophic harms, Brown then concedes that none of the harms
that he argues justify suppression of hate speech, including its
alleged silencing effect, is “of the same magnitude of gravity” as
genocide, terroristic attacks threatening national security or

187. As my colleague Gary Marchant has observed, “there is no standard text” for
the precautionary principle. Gary E. Marchant, From General Policy to Legal Rule:
Aspirations and Limitations of the Precautionary Principle, 111 ETHICS & ENVTL.
HEALTH 1799, 1800 (2002). However, he notes that each formulation of the principle
shares the prescription that “scientific certainty is not required before taking preventive
measures.” Id. In contrast, he observes that there is great variance among various
formulations of the principle in the level of threat necessary to trigger the principle. Id.
Brown does not expressly adopt a particular formulation of the precautionary principle.
But in discussing the evidentiary uncertainty of the effectiveness of hate speech bans,
Brown writes: “According to what I shall call the Precautionary Principle, where the
effects of doing nothing to reduce hate speech are sufficiently grave or serious, evidential
uncertainty about what measures are minimally effective in reducing hate speech/the
evils of hate speech ought not be used as a basis for not pursing measures that could be
effective.” BROWN, supra note 170, at 247. Note the potentially significant difference
between lack of “scientific certainty,” which Marchant reports is common to all versions
of the precautionary principle and Brown’s idiosyncratic reference to mere “evidential
uncertainty.” The former standard means that there does not have to be conclusive proof
to justify remedial measures, while the latter formulation would support, as Brown
argues for, remedies based on even the most meager evidence. In his Commentary,
Brown writes that there must be “at least some minimally adequate evidence that the
relevant activities have certain effects and that these effects are potentially harmful in
order to” apply the precautionary principle. Brown, supra note 3, at 613. He does not,
however, specify what standards are to be applied to determine the evidence in question
is “minimally adequate.” Rather he merely asserts “this threshold has been met for hate
speech and various types of silencing effect,” citing without discussion the two studies
discussed in note 173, supra.
188. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580.
189. Brown, supra note 3, at 611–12.
190. Id. at 612.
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climate change.191 He insists, though, that harms from hate
speech that he thinks justify its suppression, including the
silencing effect, “are potentially more probable harms and more
proximate harms, causally speaking.”192 It is the greater
probability and closer causal connection between hate speech
and harm that in Brown’s view put the silencing effect on par
with genocide, terroristic atrocities and global warming so far as
invocation of the precautionary principle is concerned.
Accordingly, he concludes that these factors justify putting a
heavy burden of proof on those who oppose hate speech bans to
show that the silencing effect will not occur if hate speech is left
unregulated.193
There are at least four salient defects with this remarkable
argument. First, Brown does not claim that on the scale of
gravity of harm, the silencing effect even approaches genocide,
terroristic atrocities or global warming. So invocation of these
truly catastrophic harms is largely a distraction. In addition,
Brown’s argument is question begging. That hate speech is
potentially more likely and proximately to deter people from
participating in public discourse than it is to lead to genocide or
to threaten national security tells us next to nothing about how
likely in any given society hate speech is to deter people from
participating in public discourse. But it is this probability that
Brown relies on to justify applying the precautionary principle.
The most remarkable problem with Brown’s argument,
however, is the dearth of evidence that he contends justifies
applying the precautionary principle to impose a particularly
heavy burden of proof on those who oppose hate speech bans.
To trigger application of the precautionary principle, proponents
of hate speech bans would have to adduce only “some minimally
adequate evidence” of the silencing effect.194 It is one thing to
invoke the precautionary principle to avoid a catastrophic or
191. Id.
192. Id. Brown also notes that although the silencing effect is not “strictly
irreversible,” it is not “easily reversible.” Id.
193. Specifically, those opposing the bans would have to produce evidence
“sufficiently rigorous, comprehensive and abundant to command a consensus among the
relevant body of experts” that the hate speech if left unregulated would not have a
silencing effect. Id. at 613. In contrast, to invoke the precautionary principle, and thus
shift the burden of proof, those supporting hate speech bans would have to produce only
“some minimally adequate evidence” of the silencing effect. Id.
194. See supra note 187.
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perhaps even a non-catastrophic though serious harm in the
absence of “scientific certainty” that the harm will occur.195 It is
quite another to invoke the principle when the evidence of a
serious but non-catastrophic harm can meet the vague “some
minimally adequate evidence” standard. Use of this heretofore
unknown standard to trigger the precautionary principle seems
especially concocted to fit the meagre evidence at hand.
Finally, and relatedly, Brown fails to take account of the
risks of applying the precautionary principle to ban hate speech
arising from the misapplications of these laws that I have
discussed. As Professor Cass Sunstein has explained, any
application of the precautionary principle that does not consider
“the risks on both sides of a decision” is “deeply incoherent.”196
Indeed, if as Brown argues probability and proximate cause are
to be given the decisive weight in supporting the propriety of
applying the precautionary principle, a better case might be
made that the principle supports not enacting hate speech bans.
In light of the meagre evidence that has been produced in
support of the silencing effect in most mature and stable
democracies, it could be strongly argued that imposing criminal
sanctions for expressing hateful views in public discourse would
more likely and more proximately silence people from
expressing their views in public discourse than does hate speech
itself.
In the course of making this remarkably weak argument for
application of the precautionary principle Brown does, however,
give a plausible answer to my longstanding query of what
principle would “justify shutting up A (or a group of As) so that
B (or a group of Bs) can speak?”197 Brown argues that
criminalizing the types of hate speech that he identifies for
suppression will “will not stop the speaker from expressing him
or herself in other permissible ways.” In contrast, he continues,
“in the event that hate speech has a silencing effect on those who
are its subjects, the effect is just that, silence; it can cause people

195. Id.
196. Cass R. Sunstein, Throwing Precaution to the Wind, BOS. GLOBE, July 13, 2008,
at C1.
197. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 579–80. As noted in that article, id. at 580 n.186,
Jill Hasday also suggested a plausible answer to this query, namely, that the number of
Bs being silenced by the hate speech is greater than the number of As who will be
silenced by the hate speech ban.
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not to speak in any way.”198 Of course, hate speech will not
(unless it causes death or a catatonic state) literally “cause
people not to speak in any way.” It might conceivably, though,
even in a mature and stable democracy prevent people from
engaging in public discourse not just on particular subjects, but
entirely. Such an asymmetry between the extent of silencing
caused by hate speech and hate speech bans might depending on
the size of each group provide a principle for shutting up a group
of As so that a group of Bs can speak. Indeed, if there was
persuasive evidence that hate speech in a certain society was
preventing a large group of people from participating in public
discourse entirely, it might be appropriate to invoke the
precautionary principle in support of hate speech laws even in
the absence of “scientific certainty” that such harm was
occurring or was imminent. But evidence for such a
“catastrophic antidemocratic outcome”199 is even more wanting
than it is for the usual silencing argument.
In concluding this discussion of Brown’s use of the
precautionary principle, I want to take a page out of Waldron’s
book (or rather some phrases from his Response): I wonder if
such a strong, idiosyncratic, empirically-insensitive200 version of
the precautionary principle is not “just being wheeled into the
hate speech debate” as a theory “rigged up for the purpose of
the hate speech debate.”201 As Waldron correctly notes, one way
of showing that a principle is “not rigged” is to follow it where it
leads.202 So I am curious whether Brown would be willing to
apply this version of the precautionary principle to suppress antiwar protests if a couple of studies provided not particularly
relevant evidence that such protests might lead to significant
harms to a war effort, such as interference with recruitment of
personnel. In this regard, it should be noted that these harms are
“potentially more probable harms and more proximate harms,
causally speaking”203 than graver harms that possibly could result
from anti-war protests, such as increased battlefield casualities
and even the loss of the war resulting from expression that
dispirits our troops and encourages the enemy.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Brown, supra note 3, at 614–15.
BROWN, supra note 170, at 199.
See supra note 174.
See Waldron, supra note 2, at 700.
Id.
Brown, supra note 3, at 612.
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3. Silencing and the Burden of Proof
Rather than trying to shift the burden of proof to those who
oppose hate speech laws as does Brown, Adrienne Stone makes
the more modest claim that “there is no reason, in the absence of
evidence on silencing, to err on the side of free speech.”204 There
is, in fact, a very powerful, and it seems to me conclusive, reason
for erring on the side of free speech. Or more precisely, there is
a good reason in our present state of knowledge for not enacting
hate speech laws if making sure that people are not prevented
from asserting certain views in public discourse is the goal. It is
indisputable that hate speech bans prevent people from
expressing certain views in public discourse.205 Silencing the
expression of certain views is after all is the purpose of such
laws.206 In contrast, as Gelber concedes, there is “not a great
deal” of evidence that hate speech causes such silencing.207 In
any event, Stone’s claim about on which side we should err
assumes for the sake of argument that there is not just meagre
evidence of the silencing effect but rather an “absence of
evidence on silencing.” If and when there is persuasive evidence
that hate speech as part of public discourse actually prevents
members of minority or other vulnerable groups from expressing
some viewpoint in public discourse, or worse yet, prevents them
from participating in such discourse altogether, a very difficult
problem will be presented. For under these circumstances it will
have to be determined whether a greater degree of silencing, and
hence potential damage to political legitimacy, is likely to be
produced by hate speech bans or by hate speech itself.208 But in
204. Stone, supra note 3, at 695 (emphasis added).
205. See, for example, the cases discussed in Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–58 and
summarized supra in text accompanying notes 135 to 138.
206. I am assuming here that the intended (let alone effective) scope of the ban is
not just on highly vituperative expression as Waldron imagines. Rather, in accord with
bans actually on the books, I am assuming that the scope of bans are along the lines of
those endorsed by Brown, which prohibit group defamation (sensu stricto), incitement to
hatred and perhaps even Holocaust denial. See supra note 186. These restrictions plainly
do not leave speakers free, even theoretically, to express the basic “propositional
content” of certain views.
207. See supra note 173.
208. Curiously, Gelber claims that I fail “to acknowledge what would happen to [my]
argument if [I] were to concede that hate speech itself is capable of undermining the
equal opportunity in decisionmaking” that we both agree is “fundamental to political
legitimacy.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 624. In fact, I specifically addressed this situation in
the scenario in which hate speech prevents members of an indigenous population from
speaking in public discourse in favor of an exemption from drug law prohibition of a
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the absence of any evidence of the silencing effect of hate
speech, or even with what is at best meagre evidence of such an
effect that has been proffered to date, we should indeed “err on
the side of freedom of speech” so far as avoiding damage to
political legitimacy is concerned.
4. Silencing and Speech-Act Theory
Relying on an influential essay by Professor Rae Langton,209
Gelber and Stone argue that hate speech might silence members
of historically-oppressed groups, not only literally by keeping
them from speaking as Brown alleges,210 but also by disabling
them from conveying the meaning their words ordinarily would
import. Langton argues that the way women are portrayed in
pornography might have such a disabling effect on a woman’s
ability to say “no” to man’s sexual advances. On this view, a man
who consumes pornography might simply not understand what
the woman is trying to convey by saying “no,” thereby rendering
her ability to convey her lack of consent “unspeakable.”211 It
may be that pornography has some role in contributing to the
deranged belief of too many men even in modern democracies
that when a woman says “no” to a sexual advance she does not
mean “no.”212 Neither Gelber nor Stone, however, suggests an
equivalent form of silencing arising from hate speech.
Significantly, they do not even speculate on how hateful
substance they use in their religious ceremonies. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 580–81. I
acknowledge that in such a situation banning hate speech to promote the political
legitimacy of downstream legislation would be justified if 1) the gain in legitimacy at least
marginally exceeds the detriment to legitimacy caused by the speech restriction; and 2)
there were no non-speech restrictive means by which government could ameliorate the
“silencing effect” of the hate speech. (Both of these caveats stem from the basic liberal
precept that the government always bears the burden of justifying the use of coercion,
with the weight of this burden varying depending upon the various interests at stake.) I
took a similar position with respect to resolving conflicting claims concerning systemic
legitimacy. See id. at 580 n.186.
209. Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 293
(1993).
210. Using terminology employed by Professor J.L. Austin, Langton refers to this
type of silencing as “speakers fail[ing] to perform even a locutionary act.” Id. at 315.
211. Id. at 324. Langton refers to this type of silencing as “illocutionary
disablement.” Id. at 315 (emphasis deleted).
212. See Jennifer Hornsby, Speech Acts and Pornography, in THE PROBLEM OF
PORNOGRAPHY (Susan Dwyer ed., 1995). See also, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Texas Tech Frat
Loses Charter Following ‘No Means Yes, Yes Means Anal’ Display, HUFFPOST (Oct. 9,
2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/08/texas-tech-frat-no-means-yes_n_595330
2.html.
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expression as part of public discourse might deprive a participant
in public discourse of the ability to convey her message in a way
analogous to pornography’s purported silencing effect on a
woman trying to verbally refuse a sexual advance.
Rather, Gelber and Stone, in addition to discussing the
literal silencing effect claimed by Brown,213 may be arguing that
vilification of members of historically-oppressed groups can
impair the ability of those so villified to effectively convey their
views.214 I agree that it is likely that those persuaded by hate
speech defaming, for instance, African-Americans, Muslims, or
Jews, would tend to discount anything members of these groups
have to say on matters of public concern. But while it is
important to recognize this unhappy consequence of hate
speech, preventing this harm is, in my view, not an appropriate
reason for suppressing expression in any society in which “public
opinion . . . is the final source of government.”215 Unfair
characterization of people, or groups of people, likely to have
such an effect is by no means confined to hate speech. Rather, it
is a regrettable feature of public debate on virtually any subject
but especially with discussion of contentious, highly-ideological
issues. It would be difficult to find a principled ground for

213. For instance, Gelber posits that homophobic speech in public discourse causes
same-sex couples to become “fearful of walking down the street holding hands, and
fearful of violent attacks against them and their property.” Gelber, supra note 3, at 622.
She then asks whether this reasonable fear and knowledge of the experiences of other
same-sex attracted people might mean that this “same sex couple could be silenced in
much the same way” as the Evangelical Photographer in the scenario in my Opening
Article felt unable to express her views about a pending bill to extend public
accommodation antidiscrimination to include sexual orientation. Id. See also Stone, supra
note 3, at 691–92. It is possible that even in some mature, stable democracies
homophobic speech in public discourse reasonably deters same-sex couples from publicly
supporting a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in much that
same way as I posited that hate speech laws deterred the photographer in my scenario
from opposing such a law. But given the paucity of evidence supporting the silencing
effect of hate speech, see supra note 173, including of homophobic speech, as part of
public discourse on those wishing to engage in public discourse, it is difficult to make any
meaningful assessment of this possibility. And as discussed above, Gelber’s own research
does not differentiate between hate speech constituting public discourse and that which
does not; nor does it distinguish between those deterred from participating in public
discourse from other types of “silencing.” Id. Accordingly, it does little to support her
“belie[f],” Gelber, supra note 3, at 622, that such silencing exists.
214. This was an argument made by Owen Fiss in his IRONY AND FREE SPEECH
(1996) and critiqued by me in Taking Liberties with Free Speech, 12 L. & PHIL. 159 (1998)
(book review).
215. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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limiting this variation of the silencing argument to hate speech.216
Without such a limitation, however, it would provide a rationale
for government to suppress a large swath of public discourse that
must be allowed in a free and democratic society.
D. HATE SPEECH AS CONSTITUTING HARM
Again relying on Langton, Gelber in several places in her
Commentary insists that hate speech does not just lead to harm
but by its very utterance constitutes harm. For instance, Gelber
writes that “the defining features of hate speech are . . . that it
incurs harms discursively when the hate speech is uttered, and
that these harms are analogous to other discriminatory harms,
such as denying someone a service or denying them a job on the
ground of their race.”217 Significantly, however, Gelber does not
explain or give an example of how hate speech in public
discourse can constitute a harm analogous to the ones she
mentions. I can easily imagine how speech outside of public
discourse, for instance an employer calling his black employees
“niggers,” or a “Whites Only” sign on a the door of a restaurant,
could be said to constitute harm rather than just lead to race
discrimination in employment or public accommodation.218 In
contrast, while I agree that hate speech within public discourse
might lead to discrimination against members of vulnerable
minority groups,219 I am unable to think of a plausible example

216. Accord Robert Post, Cultural Heterogeneity, and Law: Pornography,
Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 326-28 (1988). For a detailed
response to the silencing argument, including this variation, as it pertains to hate speech,
see Post, supra note 92, at 306-17.
217. Gelber, supra note 3, at 620–21. See also id. at 625 n.21. Gelber claims that like
Ronald Dworkin in his debate with Langton, I “speak[] past” and appear “not to hear or
recognize” these claims of the constitutive harm in hate speech. Id. at 622. But I am
afraid that once again it is Gelber who does not “appear . . . to recognize” that my
Opening Article was not meant to be a comprehensive discussion of the multifarious
arguments for and against hate speech regulation (and it certainly did not intend to
discuss the regulation of pornography). Rather, having dedicated the bulk of that article
to considering how hate speech bans might deprive particular downstream laws of
legitimacy, I felt it appropriate to consider also how hate speech itself might deprive
particular laws of legitimacy. Not addressing every argument in the literature that might
have some bearing on countervailing legitimacy concerns is hardly “talking past” or “not
hearing” these arguments.
218. See supra note 172.
219. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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of how such speech constitutes harm analogous to the examples
just mentioned.220
E. THE SEARCH FOR A CABINABLE RATIONALE
SUPPORTING HATE SPEECH BANS
A daunting challenge for those supporting hate speech bans
is to find a rationale for excluding hate speech that would also
not justify suppression of speech they believe should not be
banned in a free and democratic society.221 I am not denying that
such a principle exists. Indeed, the justification of the
suppression of hate speech on the grounds that it prevents others
from expressing views in public discourse or, worse yet, from
participating in this public discussion altogether, might provide
such a rationale.222 The problem with this silencing argument is
not conceptual but empirical, for as we have seen, there is scant
evidence that hate speech has such a silencing effect in any
mature and stable democracy. I have already alluded to the
untenable scope of various rationales that participants in this
Symposium have offered to try to obviate this glaring
evidentiary problem.223 But the problem of overly broad
220. Frederick Schauer suggests that the harm caused by hate speech might be
constitutive of harm in much the same way as would the disclosure of a secret algorithm
used by the Internal Revenue Service to determine whom to audit. Schauer, supra note 3,
at 666. The analogy is inapt. The harm in the disclosure of the algorithm, and the
government’s justification for prohibiting the disclosure, concern predominately, if not
exclusively, the facilitative rather than the persuasive power of speech. In contrast, the
harm in hate speech as part of public discourse, and the government’s reasons for
prohibiting such expression, is usually concerned, at least in significant part, with the
persuasive power of hate speech, such as its ability to persuade people to have false
beliefs about members of minority groups or to “stir up” hatred against them which in
turn might lead to acts of discrimination or even violence. One of the merits of Waldron’s
argument in support of the narrow hate speech bans he supports is that the harm he
emphasizes—causing members of vulnerable minority groups to feel insecure about their
status in society—is not concerned with the persuasive power of speech in this sense.
Nonetheless, even this harm is not caused by facilitative speech analogous to the speech
in Schauer’s example. An example of facilitative hate speech analogous to that in
Schauer’s hypothetical would be a list on a neo-Nazi website of the home address and
telephone number of prominent Jews, along with the names and addresses of the school
their children attend. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between persuasive and
facilitative speech and the implication of this distinction for freedom of expression, see
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Free Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 211-12 (1972).
221. I discuss this problem at length in WEINSTEIN, supra note 103.
222. Similarly, a ban on only the most vituperative forms of hate speech that leaves
speakers free to express the basic propositional content of their bigoted views might in
theory provide such a cabinable principle if it could be shown that vituperative racist
expression is more harmful than vituperation in other contexts.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 203 and 216.
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rationales for suppressing hate speech is sufficiently troubling to
warrant a more focused discussion.
Proponents of hate speech bans, including several
participants in this Symposium, make arguments that would also
apply to speech that I am confident they believe must be allowed
in a free and democratic society. I have already discussed how
under Brown’s version of the precautionary principle anti-war
speech could readily be banned.224 And so too under this
rationale, government could ban the mere glorification of
terrorism or advocacy of anti-democratic forms of government,
including communism.225 Similarly, Stone’s view that there is no
reason “to err on the side of free speech, in the absence of
evidence of silencing”226 would apply to suppressing speech to
prevent other serious harms even without evidence of their
existence.
In the much the same way, the speech-act theory that Stone
and Gelber invoke in support of suppressing hate speech could
readily be applied to speech that I believe they would not agree
could be properly suppressed. I have already discussed how one
particular version of a silencing argument would justify
suppressing any view in public discourse that arguably has that
effect.227 In addition, like Brown’s precautionary principle, their
argument that hate speech in public discourse can be banned
because it not just causes but “constitutes” discrimination could
be invoked to suppress anti-war speech condemning the draft as
“constituting” draft resistance.228 Finally, even Shiffrin’s
nuanced, harm-based rationale for suppressing hate suffers from
this overbreadth problem.

224. See supra text accompanying note 203.
225. Indeed, Brown’s idiosyncratic version of the precautionary principle bears an
uncanny and troubling resemblance to Chief Justice Vinson’s perversion of the clear and
present danger test in his plurality opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), a decision which upheld convictions of the leaders of the American Communist
Party. See supra text accompanying note 62.
226. See supra text accompanying note 204.
227. See supra text accompanying note 216.
228. As such it would through a different rationale bring us back to the notorious
lack of protection provided anti-war protestors in the United States and other
democracies during World War I. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919);
James Weinstein & Ivan Hare, General Introduction: Free Speech and the Suppression of
Extreme Speech Past and Present, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 9,
at 2–3.
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According to Shiffrin, hate speech causes the following
harms:
it is an assault on the dignity of people of color; it humiliates
and causes emotional distress, sometimes with physical
manifestations; it helps spread racial prejudice, not only
stigmatizing people of color in the eyes of the societally
dominant race but also in the eyes of [many of] the victims
themselves, inspiring self-hatred, isolation, and . . . finally, it
frequently creates the conditions for violence.229

Although Shiffrin does not maintain that these harms are
sufficient to suppress full-value public discourse, he does insist
that they are sufficient to suppress hate speech because such
expression ranks “low in the hierarchy of First Amendment
values.”230 What makes hate speech “low value” expression in
Shiffrin’s view is that in addition to being harmful, those
engaging in such expression “seek to topple the fundamental
prerequisites of a legitimate society and government,” including
“the system’s foundational premise of equality.”231 The problem
with this “low value” speech rationale is that it can be used to
suppress advocacy of radical political change, including certain
forms of Marxist speech. Like racist speech, advocacy of the
violent overthrow of democratic institutions can “create[] the
conditions for violence.” And since advocacy of violent
overthrow of democratic governemnt seeks “to topple the
fundamental prerequisites of a legitimate society and
government,” such expression can on Shiffrin’s account be
deemed “low value” expression suppressible even in the absence
of the showing of harm needed to suppress full-value speech.
229. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 477 (alteration in original) (quoting STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 77 nn.168–69 (2000)).
Shiffrin acknowledges that these claims of harm “do not depend on empirical studies, but
the experiences of human beings. When speech lacks a strong connection to the values
underlying the First Amendment, at least in my view, a demand for empirical studies
before regulation is not defensible.” Id. at 677 n.14 While I disagree with Shiffrin that a
demand for empirical evidence is “indefensible” just because speech lacks a “strong
connection” to free speech values, I agree with him that under such circumstances a
lesser quantum of empirical proof is usually justified. This is why, for instance,
commercial speech is properly regulated in some respect on less definite showing of harm
than is public discourse. Where we disagree is whether hate speech in public discourse
lacks such a strong connection. Finally, I share Shiffrin’s view that hate speech causes
many of these harms. What I am uncertain about is the extent and frequency of several
of these harms, a question that only empirical studies might help answer.
230. Id. at 677.
231. Id. at 678.
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Indeed, it is precisely this rationale that a plurality of the United
States Supreme Court used to uphold the conviction of high
ranking members of the American Communist Party for
violation of the Smith Act.232
It is worth emphasizing that I am not here making a
“slippery slope” argument. Unlike a slippery slope rationale, my
claim says nothing about what other forms of speech
government in fact will or is even likely to suppress if allowed to
suppress hate speech. Rather, I am claiming that expression that
proponents of hate speech bans likely would want protected is
fairly encompassed within various rationales they proffer to
support the suppression of hate speech.233 If I am right about
this, then those who have offered such an overly capacious
rationale should consider retracting it, not because it might in
fact lead via a slippery slope to the suppression of speech that
they think should be protected, but because it shows that the
rationale is faulty.234 Relatedly, these rationales should also be
rejected because they unduly weaken a democratic nation’s free
speech principle.235
232. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 545 (1951) (“The defendants have
been convicted of conspiring to organize a party of persons who advocate the overthrow
of the Government by force and violence [by using] language reasonably and ordinarily
calculated to incite persons to such action, and with the intent to cause the overthrow as
speedily as circumstances would permit. On any scale of values which we have hitherto
recognized, speech of this sort ranks low.”) (emphasis added) (quotation marks
removed). In response to the argument that the government could easily squelch any
resurrection that such advocacy might provoke, the plurality noted the harm that even
unsuccessful attempts “create both physically and politically to a notion . . . .” Id. at 509).
I agree with Shiffrin that in the United States the Ku Klux Klan far more effectively
promoted “governmental illegitimacy” than did the American Communist Party. See
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 678 n.16. But in other mature, stable democracies the threat of
communist subversion and thus promotion of “governmental illegitimacy” might be
greater than it was in the United States. In any event, that the harms created by racist
organizations might be marginally worse than those from radical political ones seems too
fine a distinction to provide the protection that should be afforded all forms of dissent in
a free and democratic society.
233. For further discussion of the distinction between a slippery slope argument and
an argument about the breadth of a rationale, see James Weinstein, A Constitutional
Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163, 184 (1991).
234. This does not mean, of course, that hate speech bans are not vulnerable to valid
slippery slope concerns. For a discussion of the mechanism of the slippery slope problem
of banning hate speech in the United States, see Post, supra note 92, at 315–17.
235. My complaint about the breadth of rationales for suppressing hate speech is in
one way essentially connected to a slippery slope concern. Embracing a rationale that
will allow the suppression of speech that should be permitted in a free and democratic
society will make suppression of such speech more likely. And indeed, in my view and
those of others, European democracies, including Britain, have for decades inadequately
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F. EXPANDING THE INQUIRY
Robert Post’s Commentary provides a useful supplement to
my analysis. Although briefly discussing how viewpoint-based
speech restrictions, including hate speech bans, can damage
systemic legitimacy,236 the burden of my Opening Article was to
explore the potential of hate speech bans to damage the
normative legitimacy of particular downstream laws. Robert
Post’s Commentary, in contrast, focuses on how speech
restrictions might impair the descriptive legitimacy of the legal
system. In this way, Post usefully expands the discussion.
I agree with Post that freedom of speech “allow[s] persons
of widely varying views to experience as legitimate a government
that may nevertheless act in ways that are inconsistent with their
own ideas” and that if “persons are prevented from expressing
their own views—however much others might find those views
outrageous and intolerable—then they are less likely to
experience their government as legitimate.”237 I also agree with
him that hate speech bans restricting the abusive manner in
which bigoted ideas can be expressed in public discourse can
significantly damage systemic legitimacy in the descriptive sense
by alienating people from the legal system. But this is not
primarily, as Post suggests, because such restrictions even if
properly applied to punish only bigoted ideas expressed in a
higly abusive manner,238 would interfere with these speakers’
ability to influence “the shape of public opinion” to which “their
representatives are supposed to be responsive.”239 As I discuss
above, I think that Post overestimates the extent to which
limitations on “abusive language” interfere with speakers’ ability
protected free speech in ways beyond hate speech bans, a problem which seems to have
worsened in the last few years. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Jacob
Mchangama, Europe’s Freedom of Speech Fail, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 7, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/07/europes-freedom-of-speech-fail/. I am not sure what
role hate speech bans have played in enfeebling the protection of speech in these
democracies. I suspect the causation is bidirectional, with initial weakness in overall free
speech protection allowing the enactment of hate speech bans which in turn further
weakened the protection of free speech.
236. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 678 n.16.
237. Post, supra note 3, at 656–57.
238. As I have shown, however, even if Waldron is correct that the typical hate
speech law is meant to target only highly vituperative expression such laws have been
misapplied to cover temperate expression some of which is arguably not even bigoted.
See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 552–61. Such misapplication will definitely interfere with
the speaker’s and would-be speakers’ ability to influence “the shape of public opinion.”
239. Post, supra note 3, at 655.
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to express the precise idea they wish to disseminate.240 Rather, it
is primarily the selective nature of these prohibitions that in my
view is likely to damage descriptive legitimacy. This is because
limitations on the abusive manner of expression applicable to
hate speech, but not to other types of abusive expression in
public discourse, are likely to be perceived by bigots as an unfair
attempt to muzzle them, but not opponents of equality. In
addition, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized,241
speech has an emotive as well as a cognitive function.242
Accordingly, regardless of any impairment that they may have
on speakers’ ability to “influence the shape of public opinion,”
laws that prohibit participants in public discourse from
employing abusive language to vehemently express a viewpoint
might interfere with speakers’ “experienc[ing] as legitimate a
government that might nevertheless act in ways that are
inconsistent with their own ideas.”243
Post and I are in accord that “democratic legitimacy is at
stake on both sides of the equation” in that such legitimacy is
adversely affected by the simple act of prohibiting hate speech
but depending on “the particularities of national circumstances”
legitimacy can also be undermined by allowing hate
speech . . . .”244 But it may be that Post’s view of the potential of
hate speech to damage descriptive political legitimacy is
somewhat greater than I conceive it to be. In Post’s view
descriptive legitimacy concerns the “conditions necessary for a
diverse and heterogeneous population to live together in a
240. Id. at 656. For this reason I concluded that if such restrictions on vituperation
could in practice be limited in the way Waldron supposes they are, the damage to
normative legitimacy would be minimal, though perhaps not as trivial as Waldron
suggests. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 551.
241. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
242. Shiffrin writes that I claim that racists have a First Amendment interest in
expressing bigoted ideas as a way of “feel[ing] better.” Shiffrin, supra note 3 at 678 n.16
(citing Weinstein, supra note 1, at 551). Shiffrin is wrong that I was claiming here that
racists or anyone else have a constitutionally significant interest in participating in public
discourse so as to “feel better.” Rather, I was arguing that contrary to Waldron’s claim
that the purpose of racist speech is to make vulnerable minorities unsure of their status in
society, another reason that bigots might engage in racist rants in public discourse is not
so much “to make minorities feel bad . . . but to make [themselves] feel better.”
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 551. Interestingly, however, the emotive function of public
discourse emphasized by the Court in Cohen would seem to recognize something at least
akin to a First Amendment interest in participating in public discourse to “feel better,”
including by using offensive or abusive language to express an idea.
243. Post, supra note 3, at 656.
244. Id. at 658.
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relatively peaceable manner under a common system of
governance and politics.”245 On this specification, expression that
impedes the goal of such a population “liv[ing] together in a
relatively peaceable manner,” an effect that hate speech might
well have in various societies, would damage legitimacy even if it
did not prevent anyone from participating in the democratic
process. Such intergroup conflict is a serious harm that should be
accounted for in any assessment of the propriety of hate speech
laws in a free and democratic society. I am not sure, however, it
should be counted as a detriment to political legitimacy, at least
not without further explanation.
Vincent Blasi’s superb Commentary begins by meticulously,
accurately and fairly summarizing the essence of both Waldron’s
and my positions in our debate about hate speech regulation and
political legitimacy. It then points out what he considers to be
the strengths and weaknesses of both of our positions.246 I am
enormously grateful to Blasi for taking the time and care to
understand what I was trying to accomplish in my Opening
Article.247
Blasi kindly credits my argument as offering a “fresh
account of why viewpoint discrimination might be problematic”
in arguing that viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on public
discourse offend the basic democratic premise that each person
in society has “equal civic standing.”248 He notes that on this
account “viewpoint discrimination is not about the quality of
public debate,” as posited by Professor Geoffrey Stone, or about
“the rightful sources of governmental authority,” as emphasized
by Judge Learned Hand. Rather, Blasi correctly observes that
my indictment of viewpoint discrimination derives from “the
equal treatment of individuals,” which entails “[r]espect for the
civic dignity of each individual speaker.”249

245. Id. at 651.
246. Blasi, supra note 3.
247. In a previous Symposium in which Blasi, Post and I participated, Post wrote of
Blasi’s commentary on his target article: “Professor Vincent Blasi most generously
catches the fundamental aspiration of my own work . . . .” Robert Post, Participatory
Democracy as A Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 627 (2011). I feel
the same way about Blasi’s generous effort to understand the “fundamental aspiration”
of my Opening Article in this Symposium.
248. Blasi, supra note 3, at 593–94.
249. Id. at 594.
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Blasi accurately notes that any answer I might have to
Waldron’s “powerful critique” of my claim that upstream hate
speech restrictions can deprive downstream antidiscrimination
laws of legitimacy has to come from my equality-based rationale
for impugning viewpoint discrimination.250 He comes to no
conclusion, however, about whether this rationale provides
sufficient support for my “imaginative legitimation argument,
which Waldron has questioned effectively.”251 Rather, he thinks I
have a “more straightforward line of support” from my case
against hate speech regulation, namely, an argument based
directly on equal civic standing.252 Such an argument, in Blasi’s
view, would have the advantage of being commensurable with
Waldron’s argument that hate speech undercuts the civic dignity
of members of vulnerable minority groups.253
Blasi does not decide whether the insult to civic dignity
wrought by hate speech bans is justified by the protection of
civic dignity it produces but rather offers some observations
about the “variables” that might be used in such an analysis.254
Except for some reservations about his claim that “the most
important value at stake in the comparison” is freedom of
thought,255 I agree that the approach Blasi suggests would be
fruitful. But more importantly, I applaud Blasi for building on
what he generously referred to as a “promising line of inquiry”
opened up in the debate between Waldron and me to expand the
discussion in a useful direction.
CONCLUSION
It has long been recognized that free speech promotes the
legitimacy of a legal system. This is one important reason that
free speech is highly valued in liberal democracies. It also
explains why a proliferation of laws that impede the ability of
250. Id. at 592. As indeed it does. See supra text accompanying notes 37–39.
251. Blasi, supra note 3, at 593–94.
252. Id. What such direct reliance on equal citizenship sacrifices, however, is the
legitimating function of free speech, especially as it relates to justifying the government’s
use of force to make people comply with laws with which they reasonably disagree.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 554.
255. I have previously expressed concern about positing freedom of thought as the
basis of American free speech doctrine. See James Weinstein, Seana Shiffrin’s ThinkerBased Theory of Free Speech: Elegant and Insightful, But Will It Work in Practice, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2011).
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citizens to express their views on matters of public concern
would substantially impair the legitimacy of a legal system. But
as crucial as free speech is to political legitimacy, it cannot
plausibly be argued that even the most egregious law restricting
free speech that realistically might be enacted in a mature and
stable democracy could destroy or even severely damage the
legitimacy of the entire legal system.256 Rather, given the level of
legitimacy that these democracies enjoy, even the most poorlyjustified speech restriction likely to be enacted will usually only
reduce the legal system’s legitimacy “reservoir” by some barely
perceptible amount.257 For this reason, those who favor
restraining speech that they believe inimical to some goal, policy
or value that they care passionately about will likely conclude, at
least so far as legitimacy is concerned, that banning such speech
is well worth the miniscule reduction in the legal system’s ample
legitimacy reserve.258
In contrast, unlike the negligible damage that a single
speech restriction can inflict on the systemic legitimacy of a
mature and stable democracy, the harm to the legitimacy of
particular downstream laws resulting from an upstream speech
restriction can be considerable, sometimes even ruinous. Of
course, such damage to legitimacy, both descriptive and
normative, will be more likely if the speech restriction is
dramatically lacking in justification. But as my Evangelical
Photographer scenario and some actual cases I discuss reveal,259
this palpable damage to legitimacy can sometimes result even if
the speech restriction is, as I believe is the case with many hate

256. At least this is true of normative legitimacy, my primary concern in this
Symposium. With respect to descriptive legitimacy, it may be that a speech restriction
might for some individuals destroy any sense of political obligation they have to the legal
system.
257. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 148–49
(1971).
258. In this way, the relationship between free speech and political legitimacy is not
unlike the relationship between junk food and health. While a steady diet of greasy
hamburgers and fries will over time likely have a deleterious, sometimes even fatal, effect
on one’s health, fortunately for those of us who on very rare occasions like to eat a Big
Mac or the like, one such meal, or even two or three a year, will for otherwise healthy
people not lead to such baneful results. Unfortunately, another characteristic that both
poorly-justified speech restrictions and consumption of junk food have in common is that
one indulgence tends to lead to another.
259. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 567–74.
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speech laws on the books, not “indefensible”260 but merely on
balance unjustified.
So did this novel take on the relationship between free
speech and political legitimacy, developed beyond cursory
statements for the first time in this Symposium, survive the
intense scrutiny to which it was subjected by the Response and
eight Commentaries? To my mind, the most powerful objection
was the contention that if a speech restriction was justified, it
could not deprive a downstream law of normative legitimacy. As
I explained, I am not sure that this objection is valid, especially
when the iterative nature of a legal justification is considered.
But even if the objection is correct, the idea I defended
nonetheless serves to reveal a previously unidentified cost of
unjustified speech restrictions. In addition, this objection has no
bearing on the damage to descriptive legitimacy that can result
from even justified viewpoint-discriminatory speech restrictions.
In contrast, the other objections did not take issue with my
basic contention that speech restrictions that unduly prevent
people from expressing their views in public discourse can
compromise, both normatively and descriptively, the legitimacy
of downstream legislation.261 Rather, this criticism focused on my
claim about the scope and extent of the impediment imposed by
hate speech bans on the expression of bigoted viewpoints in
public discourse; on my assessment of the potential for hate
speech itself to undermine political legitimacy; and on the proper
legal response in the absence of any persuasive evidence that
hate speech prevents the subjects of such speech from
participating in the political process. I am content to leave open
for now the question of whether hate speech laws as they
currently operate in many democracies damage the legitimacy of
downstream laws, particularly antidiscrimination measures, and

260. See supra note 104.
261. The one exception was Jeremy Waldron’s critique which doubted that legal
restrictions on the “chaotic and unformed” public debate can have the direct
consequences for legitimacy that I claim they can, Waldron, supra note 2, at 709, and
simultaneously pressed the view that voting for one’s representative was the primary way
that legislation was legitimized. Id. at 708. I agree that under such a parsimonious view
about the relative importance of free speech to political legitimacy, it would be difficult
to make the case that speech restrictions can seriously damage or even destroy the
legitimacy of certain applications of downstream laws. But not only is Waldron’s view
normatively unappealing, it also does not accurately describe free speech as it operates in
contemporary liberal democracies. See Post, supra note 3, at 654–55.
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if so, the extent to which this loss of legitimacy might be offset by
increased participation in public discourse by the subjects of hate
speech. What I hope that I have demonstrated in this
Symposium is that a law that restricts the right of citizens to
express particular views in public discourse—be it a hate speech
ban, a blasphemy law, a prohibition on anti-war speech, or a law
that forbids advocacy of radical political change—can impair,
and in rare cases even destroy, the legitimacy of downstream
laws.

